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The present state of international trade law governing commercial 
contracts seems to be far from satisfactory. A commercial transaction 
between parties from different countries gives rise to a variety of legal 
issues that normally find no counterpart in a purely domestic 
transaction. 1 Since the traditional way of dealing with an international 
commercial contract is to make reference to the rules of private 
international law of the lex fori, in most cases rules of municipal law will 
govern the legal relationship between the parties. Yet, domestic law is 
not tailored to meet the specific requirements of modem international 
sales, and thus may often provide legal solutions that are not appropriate 
to cross-border transactions at all. 
Against this background, the idea of a uniform world trade law has 
emerged and has given rise to various attempts made by national 
legislators, as well as private and public organisations, to set forth special 
rules to govern international transactions. The most famous example for 
such uniform contract law rules is, without any doubt, the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) which was set up in 1980 and came into force on the 1st of 
January 1988.2 
There is, however, a more recent set of rules which, in view of the 
apparent failures of the CISG, seems to proliferate in this field: the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (in the 
following referred to as the ''Principles"). These were published in 1994 
1 For instance: carriage of goods and the inherent risks of damage and loss, 
fluctuating exchange rates, regulations of foreign trade in form of export and import 
licences or other trade barriers etc .. See M. Ndulo, The United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) and the Eastern and Southern 
African Preferential Trade Area, 3 (1987) Lesotho Law Journal 127, at 132 
2 South Africa is not a party to the Convention yet. The fact that South Africa, in 
contrast to the 46 memberstates of the CISG, has failed to sign the Convention up to 
now, may be the result of the long-lasting isolation of the country within the 
international trading and business community for reasons of apartheid Several 
writers who have recently evaluated the Convention's impact on international 
business, have recommended that the South African Government ratify the CISG. 
See, for instance, S. Viejobu.eno, Progress through compromise: the 1980 United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 28 (1995) 
CILSA 200, at 227; Clement Ng'ong'ola, The Vienna Sales Convention of 1980 in 
the Southern African legal environment: formation of a contract of sale, 4 (1992) 
RADIC 835, at 853; the same, The Vienna Sales Convention of 1980 and sales law of 
Southern Africa, 7 (1995) RADIC 227, at 256. 
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by UNIDROIT3 which eventually set them up after a long period of 
deliberation that had lasted for more than 14 years. 
It has to be stressed, however, that the Principles are no uniform law in 
the proper sense, since they are not binding in character. 4 There seems to 
be a tendency to depart from the traditional approach within the 
international business world, where a large number of non-legislative 
rules are already being applied. 5 Therefore, it is not so surprising that the 
Principles, in the two years since their publication, have met with great 
success among the international business and legal community. 6 More 
than 3000 copies of the Principles have been sold world-wide. It appears 
that they are not a deadletter, but they are relied upon among the world 
trading community. 
In Part one, light will be shed on the idea of a universal unified set of 
rules for commercial transactions in general. The historical aspect will be 
taken into consideration by elucidating the concepts of ius commune and 
the English law merchant. The question will be raised as to why there is 
a need for unified law in the field of international sales at all, by which 
means it can be created, and what would be the impact of such unified 
rules on the national legal system with particular regard to the conflict of 
law rules. 
Part two will deal with the UNIDROIT Principles for Commercial 
Contracts. It will be demonstrated how they came into existence and 
what the intention of their drafters was, in particular in the light of the 
successful CISG already published at the time the UNIDROIT working 
group started the elaboration of its Principles. Furthermore, the different 
ways of applying the Principles will be considered. Finally, account will 
be given of the Principles' reception among the international business 
and legal community. 
3 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, which is an 
independent intergovernmental organisation. See Part two I. South Africa is a 
member to UNIDROIT. 
4 See Introduction to the Principles, 
Internet http:llwww.unidroit.org/englishlprinciples/intro-l.htm on 05/14/98, at p.2. 
5 The INCOTERMS of the International Chamber of Commerce, for example 
6 M.J. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice -The Experience of the First 
Two Years, Internet: http://www.unidroit.org/englishlprincipleslpr-exper.htm on 
05/l 4/98, at p. l. The author draws this conclusion from a formal inquiry launched by 
the UNIDROIT Secretariat among the users of the Principles in 1996. There will be 
given further account of this report in Part two IV. 
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In Part three, an attempt will be made to evaluate the impact the 
UNIDROIT Principles might have on South Afiican law of contract in 
general, What changes the application of the UNIDROIT Principles 
would actually introduce into an international transaction for a local 
buyer or seller will be considered by comparing the rules of South 
Afiican contract law with the provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
Attention will be given to the formation of contract, interpretation, 
performance, breach of performance and the respective remedies. 
PART ONE: THE CONCEPT OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW IN 
GENERAL 
I. Historical development of the idea 
The idea of unifying rules of private law in general was not born in 
recent times. 
7 
It has had two famous predecessors in the field of 
international trade, one of them even goes back to the times of Roman 
law. The Roman ius gentium was intended to govern contracts made 
among Roman citizens only. Commercial relations between a Roman 
citizen and a non-citizen could not be covered by those rules, for their 
application was based on the active personality principle. When cross-
boundaries trade proliferated, Roman lawyers, instead of sacrifying the 
strict application of the active personality principle, and thus extending 
the sphere of application of Roman law to those peregrines, 8 decided to 
create uniform law rules applicable to everybody to govern those cross-
border transactions. This body oflaw was the so-called ius gentium. This 
first example of uniform law, however, was not the result of a 
comprehensive comparative study of the different legal regimes that 
existed at the time, because its drafters decided for themselves what 
should be considered "reasonable opinions of law that are common to all 
people".9 
7 A Spickhoff, Intemationales Handelsrecht vor Schiedsgerichten und staatlichen 
Gerichten, 56 (1992) Rabels Zeitschrift 116, at 118; C. v.Bar, Internationales 
Privatrecht, 1st Volume, Muenich 1987, at 23 
8 v.Bar, note 7, at 26 
9 v.Bar, note 7, at 27 
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Several centuries later, a comparable development took place in England 
when the law merchant came into existence. It was created by English 
judges due to the fact that English ordinary courts were reluctant to 
apply any law other than English law. 10 The conflict of laws which, on 
the Continent, was resolved by referring to the rules of private 
international law, was governed by the concept of jurisdiction in 
England where there were no such rules. An English court that 
considered itself competent to decide in a matter automatically applied 
its domestic law to the dispute. But it was not likely that foreign traders 
would agree to be exclusively governed by English law if a dispute arose 
before an English Court. 11 Thus the new law merchant, i.e. a set of rules 
of modern business law appropriate to cross-border transactions was 
created. 
In addition, specific commercial tribunals were created at significant 
ports in different countries. It can thus be assumed that, at the time, an 
internationally applicable system of uniform sales law applied by 
merchants regardless of their nationalities and legal backgrounds12 
existed to govern commercial matters. 
The increasing trend towards nationalisation and the inherent wish of 
every state to create its own commercial law code in the 18th and 19th 
century, led to the gradual decline of the law merchant. 13 The universal 
commercial law did not reflect the international reality any more. It had 
become obsolete. 
The idea of a uniform private or commercial law was reborn more than 
200 years later. In 1893, the first Conference on Private International 
Law took place at the Hague, but more serious efforts were only made in 
the second half of this century, due to the dramatic increase in 
transnational commerce and the need for a correspondent legislative 
policy designed to regulate it. 14 There has been a continuing effort by 
legislators to create uniform rules for this purpose since then. 15 
10 Spickhoff, note 7, at ll8 
11 v.Bar, note 7, at 30 
12 loc.cit. at ll9 
13 It can be inferred from the decision of the English court in the case of Pi I/ans v. 
Van Mierop in 1765, English Reports 97, 1035, that the law merchant had lost its 
international ambit and had simply been transformed into the national commercial 
law of England. See v.Bar, note 7, at 31 
14 F. Ferrari, Defining the Sphere of Application of the 1994 "UNIDROIT Principles 
oflnternational Commercial Contracts", 69 (1975) Tulane Law Review 1225 
15 For instance, the Hague Sales Convention of 1964, the CISG of 1980 etc. 
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Even though some points are common to those two famous old models 
of uniform law and today's uniform sets of rules, 16 one striking 
difference has to be borne in mind: modem uniform law does not, by its 
very nature, form universally applicable law. It is only valid in those 
states which are party to the corresponding convention. In a world of 
sovereign states of equal value, no single state is in a position to dictate 
rules of law to the rest of the world. No state may hold that, in its 
opinion, these rules form the natural reason of all human beings and are 
thus binding on everyone, as it was the case at Roman times. 
Today uniform law is national law, and the only feature to distinguish it 
from common national law is the fact that it has been created in 
collaboration with several states and is applicable in foreign legal systems 
as well. 17 
It is noteworthy that the international business world itself, through its 
organisations, has created a large variety of rules, such as standard-form 
contracts and standard terms, usages and the incoterms. 18 
IL The various methods needed to achieve unification of law 
There are two basic techniques that are usually followed to achieve this 
aim. The first relates to unifying the rules of private international law, 
whereas the second consists of harmonising and unifying substantive 
rules of law. 19 The 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations20 is an excellent example of the first alternative, 
whereas the most famous example for unified substantial law can be seen 
in the CISG created in 1980. 
16 It is again, predominantly, international commercial law. 
17 v.Bar, note 7, at 50 
18 See Spickhoff, note 7, at 119; It is, however, not clear what the legal nature of 
such non-legislative systems of rules is, and whether they can be considered sources 
oflaw that the courts can refer to. See v. Bar, note 7, at 78 and Spickhoff, note 7, at 
117. 
19 R. David, The Methods of Unification, 16 (1968-9) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 13; F. Ferrari, note 14, at 1226-7 
20 The Convention is the product of the efforts of member states of the former 
European Economic Community (EEC) to harmonise their rules of law. Even though 
only member states of the Community may sign the convention, its rules have an 
international scope, in the sense that the convention replaces the choice-of-law rules 
of the contracting states. 
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The first approach assures the parties to a contract that, no matter which 
forum judges their dispute, their reference to the rules of private 
international law will point to the same municipal system of law. 
Unification of the substantive rules, however, does not only provide legal 
certainty as to the municipal law which will apply to the contract, but it 
defines the precise rules of law applicable to the dispute. The advantage 
is that a national judge does not have to embark on the laborious task of 
determining the rules of an unknown municipal law system and this law's 
ability to apply usages and practices of international trade to the 
contract,21 which creates an enormous legal uncertainty. 
However, there is no clear answer as to which technique is preferable. 
Whereas the second method can definitely provide more comprehensive 
legal certainty for the parties, and therefore happens to be considered 
"superior"22 or "of a higher level"23, the first is more likely to be agreed 
upon within the international community, since it affects the national 
legal environments only to a relatively small extent. Furthermore, a faF 
simpler process of creation is necessary to unify the conflict of law rules 
instead of substantive rules. 24 
Unification of rules of law has almost exclusively taken the form of 
obligatory instruments, such as supranational legislation, 25 international 
conventions26 or only model laws27 in cases where such a broad 
censensus can not be obtained. However, as evidenced by the 
UNIDROIT Principles, it is also conceivable to create a non-binding set 
of rules. 28 This apparently striking difference between binding and non-
binding instruments considerably loses its force when their use in 
practice is taken into account. Model laws leave wide room for a state's 
discretion to include changes when it transforms the model act into 
national law.29 Conventions, on the other hand, offer numerous 
21 David, note 19, at 17 
22 P. Winship, Private International Law and the U.N. Sales Convention, cited in: 
Ferrari, note 14, at 1227 note 19 
23 G. Eoersi, The Hague Conventions of 1964 and the Internationale Sale of Goods, 
cited in: Ferrari, note 14, at 1227 note 19 
24 0. Lando, European Contract Law, in: Ferrari, note 14, at 1227 note 20 
25 Legislation within the EU, for instance. 
26 Such as the CISG, for example. 
27 For instance, the UNCITRAL model act on International Commercial Arbitration 
of 1985. 
28 see part II on UNIDROIT 
29 F. Diedrich, Chancen und Ziele von Einheitsrecht fuer-Sen internationalen 
Handelsverkehr, (1992) Zeitschrift fuer die Internationale Praxis, 408 at 409 
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occasions to exclude their application in certain cases by making 
reservations.30 The only truly binding form of uniform law, therefore, 
seems to be supranational legislation; but this requires surrender of 
legislative powers to a supranational authority, as is the case within the 
European Union. It is thus not very likely to be the common model for 
creating uniform law. 
ID. The need for unifying commercial law today 
Applying national rules of private international law subjects law at an 
international level to a considerable legal uncertainty and 
unpredictability.31 The parties to an international transaction are thus in 
fear of being exposed to unfamiliar and possibly disadvantageous rules of 
a foreign legal system. 
In order to illustrate this, let us consider the usual way in which an 
international case is treated before a national court. 
n: in an international contrac~ it becomes necessary to determine the 
proper law governing the contractual relationship, the traditional 
approach by state courts is to refer to the rules of conflict of law of the 
forum state. 
Since there is no uniform system of conflict of law rules, except for some 
occasional models of unification of the rules of private international 
law,32 the outcome of such an international dispute will entirely depend 
on the forum where the parties instituted their proceedings and the rules 
of private international law of the forum. 33 
However, even if there were a uniform system of conflict of law rules, 
this would not necessarily entail uniformity in the outcome of the 
particular case. Although the rules point to the same national legal 
system, the substantive rules applicable to the case would not necessarily 
have to be the same, since the mandatory rules of the forum assert 
30 David, note 19, at 19-20 
31 H. Booysen, The International Sale of Goods, (1991-2) SAYIL 71, at 72 
32 For example, the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations of 1980 
33 H. Booysen, note 31, at 72 
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In addition, even if the rules of conflict of law are unified; it cannot be 
denied that national courts have a tendency to obtain applicability of 
their own Jaw by interpreting the connecting factors in a particular way 
. c. h 34 m pre1erence to anot er. 
Furthermore, making reference to the choice of law rules of the forum 
still only results in the application of a certain domestic Jaw system. As 
mentioned above, municipal law is ill-suited to international purposes 
and usuaUy unable to provide appropriate solutions to the particular 
demands of an international sale. 35 In addition, foreign domestic law is 
difficult for a judge to assess. 
Finally, the application of the national rules of conflict of law does not 
necessarily point to the best legal regime. The purpose of the conflict of 
law is to provide justice in terms of private international law, but not 
necessarily substantial justice. 36 
There are, however, several arguments against uniform commercial law. 
First, it is argued that just creating uniform law does not take us any 
further in our search to eliminate the apparent inconveniences of the 
traditional approach. It is a mistaken belief to consider that identical legal 
rules will operate in the very same way in different legal systems with 
their particular social and political settings. 37 This is not necessarily due 
to failures of the statutes themselves, but will mainly result from 
jurisprudence which is reluctant to apply an autonomous interpretation. 
As long as there is no exclusive international commercial tribunal to 
apply uniform law in a consistent manner, national courts will continue 
to use their national law when it comes to interpreting or filling gaps left 
open by the unified rules38. There is thus no reason to believe that the 
34 K.P. Berger, Die UNIDROIT Prinzipien fuer International Handelsvertraege, 94 
H995) Zeitschrift fuer Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 217, at 222 
see note 1 above 
36 Berger, note 34, at 222 
37 A Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification and Reform in 
International Commercial Law, 40 (1992) American Journal of Comparative Law 
683, at687 
38 Even though this is expressly rejected in most of the uniform laws where it is 
stated that the rules should be interpreted in an autonomous way, international 
practice shows that courts tend to apply their national laws to those issues. 
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outcome of the cases will be truly uniform as a result of the mere 
existence of a unified international sales law. 39 
Secondly. unifying rules of private law is in general deemed an unfeasible 
and neverending task. 40 It is true that uniform law, in principle, can only 
provide fragmentary sets of rules dealing with selective issues. As 
reference has to be made to the rules of private international law to 
determine the law applicable to the remaining issues, uniform law is not 
of great help when it comes avoiding use of domestic law systems. 
However. this point could be easily counterargued by saying that every 
legal innovation takes a certain time before it is eventually accepted. 41 
The reason for the incompleteness of uniform law mainly resides in the 
fact that it is usually the result of complex international diplomatic 
negotiations between representatives of states who are anxious to defend 
their respective national interests to the utmost. This then leads to 
uneasy compromises,42 a State's willingness to compromise seeming to 
depend largely on their respective bargaining position. 43 The stronger 
this is. the less they will be inclined to sacrifice applicability of their own 
law and the inherent legal certainty for their citizens. This inconvenience 
could be bypassed by using an approach like UNIDROIT did in form of 
the Principles. 
Businessmen, in reaction to the obvious imperfection of the rules 
provided for by national legislative law, strive to avoid the use of 
national law. That is why they define the nature of their obligations in 
standard-form contracts and provide that the settlement of their disputes 
be entrusted to arbitration tribunals. 44 This presents a considerable 
danger to the "weaker" a.n4 inexperienced parties. particularly from 
developing countries, who might be forced to accept the self-created 
39 R. Hyland, On Setting Forth the Law of Contract: A Foreword, (1992) American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 541, at 542 
40 H. Koetz, cited in U. Magnus, Die allgemeinen Grundsaetze im UN-Kaufrecht, 59 
p995) Rabels Zeitschrift 469, at 471 
1 In the field of uniform law, the first set of rules of importance, the Hague Sales 
Convention of 1964, was very mµch criticised. for its gaps and one-sided provisi9ns. 
Then UNCITRAL create4 based on this old modelJ the CISG_, as an improved and 
supplemented version of unified sales law which gained enormous success within the 
international business community. 
42 See, for example, the obvious contradiction within the CISG between Articles 14 
and 55 as regards open-price contracts, and Article 28 that allows courts not to enter 
~ jµdgment f9r ~ific performance if this is not in e9mpliance with their own law, 
See Viejobueno, note 2, at 202-212 
43 ibid at 202 
44 David, note 19, at 22 seq. 
rules imposed upon them by their stronger business partners. Such 
standard terms not only tend to be one-sided, but they inevitably are also 
influenced by the legal concepts of their drafters' countries of origin. 45 
This risk will definitely result in a disinclination on the part of traders, in 
particular those from poorer and developing countries, to enter into 
cross-border transactions. Not only would providing a readily applicable 
and balanced set of rules encourage them to concluding an international 
transaction, thus leading to an effective protection of such disadvantaged 
parties by cutting their risk exposure to unknown and biased rules, but it 
would also reduce the cost of such international business transactions as 
a whole. 46 There would be no need to launch expensive enquiries into 
unknown applicable national law. 
In addition, uniform law could create one legal language to replace the 
different languages of the domestic systems and thus prevent 
misunderstandings in contract negotiations and performance. 
As a result, it seems that uniform sales law might well be in a position to 
give massive new impetus to international trade. This might lead to an 
increased and more stable global economic co-operation that could serve 
as a means against political instability, especially in the case of poorer 
countries. 47 
In summary, despite all the difficulties encountered in the process of 
creating uniform law, in the long run the advantages it provides with 
respect to the general increase of international trade activities seem to 
outweigh the obvious problems. 
The ideal would certainly be to constitute a world commercial court to 
judge all international commercial transactions by applying uniform 
universal trade law in an equitable manner.
48 
Yet, as long as this remains 
a dream, for it would require the national surrender of jurisdiction in 
international commercial cases 49, to create and apply a unified code of 
consistent rules would at least be a good start. 
45 M.J. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles oflnternational Commercial Contracts: 
Why? What? How?, 69 (1995) Tulane Law Review 1121 at 1124 
46 Ndulo, note 1, at 130 
47 Diedrich, note 29, at 409 
48 G.A. Barton, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, 18 (1995) CILSA 21, at 26: Diedrich, note 29, at 411 
49 B l . arton, oc.Cit. 
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IV. The impact of uniform law on the domestic legal systems 
Uniform law affects domestic law rules in two ways. First, within its 
sphere of application, it replaces the substantive rules of the domestic 
law system which would otherwise have been found to be applicable to 
the dispute by the forum's rules of private international law. Secondly, it 
might render futile the conflict of law rules of the forum. 
It is true that, a priori, rules of unified law and private international law 
are in opposition to each other.50 Whereas uniform law, by virtue of its 
direct applicability to the contract, is aimed at avoiding conflicts between 
different legal systems, the purpose of the rules of private international 
law is to interfere when there actually are conflicts arising from the 
existence of several legal systems which might be applicable to a certain 
legal relationship. It thus follows that directly applicable rules of uniform 
law considerably diminish the importance of the conflict of law rules.51 
However, this does not infer that private international law loses its right 
to exist. Quite the reverse is true. Even if uniform law can, indeed, affect 
the scope of application of the conflict of law rules, the latter will still 
play an important role by reason of their intrinsic predominance. As long 
as national rules of private international law do not give the order to 
apply uniform rules of law, the unified law will play no role in the legal 
dispute, 52 Uniform law cannot claim preferential application on the mere 
grounds of its noble purpose. 53 It is entirely dependent on the rules of 
private international law to select it from. among the different legal 
systems that could govern the legal relationship in question. The uniform 
rules thus are on a level with the substantial rules of domestic law. 54 
Consequently, as long as there remain areas of law that are not entirely 
governed by unified rules, the rules of private international law will not 
lose any of their importance. The achievement of this goal is not yet in 
sight On the one hand, no uniform law is universally applicable so far. 
On the other band, even in areas where uniform rules already exist, 
reference to the rules of private international law is still made when it 
comes to determining the law applicable to those issues not covered by 




53v.Bar, note 7, at 66 
54 loc.cit. 
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the uniform rules55, or when the exact sphere of application of the 
uniform set of rules is to be defined. 56 
As a consequence, it seems to be clear that in the presence of true 
uniform law, private international law rules still stand their ground. 
PART TWO: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
The UNIDROIT Principles as a non-binding instrument appear to 
constitute a completely new approach to international trade law. 57 They 
are the result of harsh criticisms expressed towards intergovernmental 
legislative instruments, such as conventions and model laws. They are 
mostly rather fragmentary in character with the consequence that they 
need to be supplemented by domestic laws. An increasing number of 
voices were therefore raised in favour of recourse to non-legislative 
means of unification of law. 58 Some of these advocated creating model 
clauses and contracts formulated by the interested business circles on the 
basis of current trade practices and relating to specific types of 
transactions only.59 Since this presupposes a more general regulatory 
system within which to apply those model clauses, others went even 
further and advocated the elaboration of a sort of "modem ius 
commune" at a supra-national level which was to provide rules for 
contract law in general, The UNIDROIT Principles for International 
Commercial Contracts are the result of such endeavours. Reflecting all 
the major legal systems of the world, they are intended to cover the 
whole area of contract law without being conceived in terms of specific 
55 see Article 7 para.(2) CISG for instance 
56 see, for example, Article 1 para.(l)(b) of the CISG 
57 Bonell, note 45, at 1122 
58 In the international context, there is a need to adapt the applicable rules in 
con_fomijty with the developing practice in the international business world Statutes, 
however, do not leave enough room for such flexibility. The creation of uniform law 
on a legislative basis being a difficult and very time-ronsumjng process, the rules 
have often become "obsolete" at the time when they enter into force. In the case of the 
CISG, for example, it took 18 years until the convention came into force in 1988! See 
with respect to this issue: Diedrich, note 47, at 410; introduction to the UNIDROIT 
Principles by the Governing Council ofUNIDROIT, Internet 
http://www. unidroit.orglenglishlprincipleslintro-1.htm at p. l 
59 M.J. Bonell, Unification of Law by Non-legislative Means: The UNIDROIT Draft 
Principles for International Commercial Contracts, (1992) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 617, at 617-18 
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types of transactions. The Principles, therefore, provide a set of rules 
applicable to all commercial contracts whatever their specific nature, 
I. Creation of the UNIDROIT Principles 
UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organisation with its 
seat in Rome. Its purpose is 'to examine ways of harmonising and co-
ordinating the private law of States and of groups of States. and to 
prepare gradually for the adoption by the various States of uniform rules 
of private law. '60 UNIDROIT was initially set up as an auxiliary organ of 
the League of Nations in 1926, and, following the latter's demise, was 
re-established in 1940 on the basis of the multilateral agreement of the 
UNIDROIT Statute. Today the organisation is composed of 57 member 
States61 representing the whole world. 
In 1971 the Governing Council whose task it is to draw up the Institute's 
Work Programme, decided to extend its activities to the domain of 
contract law and launched preliminary inquiries into the feasibility of 
such a project. It took several years before a special Working Group 
including representatives62 of all the major legal and socio-economic 
systems of the world was eventually constituted in 1980. It then took 
these experts almost 14 years to bring their task to an end so that the 
Principles were presented to the public as late as 1994. They are 
composed of 119 articles divided into seven chapters: "General 
Provisions" "Formation" "Validity" "Interpretation" "Content" , , , , ' 
"Performance", and "Non-performance". The single articles are drafted 
in the style of the European codifications, but the structure of the rules 
itself calls to mind the American Restatement of the Law: a general rule 
of law is followed by short explanations in form of comments and 
·11 . 1 63 1 ustratmg examp es. 
The drafters of the Principles did not intend to create completely new 
rules, but they understood their task to be one of restating the existing 
60 See General Information on UNIDROIT on the Internet 
http://www.unidroit.org/englishlpresentation/pres.htm at p. l 
61 They are listed on the Internet, see previous footnote. South Africa is also party to 
UNIDROIT. 
62 They were all leading experts in the field of comparative law and international 
trade law, academJcs, ltJg_h ran..kingjudges or civil servants. See Bonell, note 59, at 
619 
63 Berger, note 34, at 218 
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international contract law. They were inspired by two thoughts. First, the 
drafters intended to enunciate rules that are common to most of the 
existing legal systems. Secondly, they strove to create rules to provide 
solutions which seems best suited to the specific needs of the 
international business world. 64 As a consequence, in the case of 
disparities between the different legal systems. the drafters did not select 
the rule by arithmetic means by preferring the one which was supported 
the majority of the legal systems at domestic level. They based their 
decision on the persuasive value of the different possible solutions and 
considered which solution might be the most appropriate on an 
international level. 65 
When drafting the Principles, the Working group made reference to the 
different national codifications and, in particular, considered the more 
recent ones, such as the Unjted States Corn_mercial Code, the new Dutch 
Code of 1992 and the new Civil Code of Quebec of 1994·. 66 On an 
international level, an outstanding point of reference was, of course, the 
CISG. Some of its provisions were introduced into the new set of 
Principles67, some literally and some in part. Furthermore, the drafters 
sought inspiration from non-legislative instruments that had been created 
by private organisations of the international business world and are 
widely refereed to in international trade practice. such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce's INCOTERMS and Uniform 
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. 68 
It is worth noting, however, that the drafters of the Principles abstained 
from naming the specific sources of inspiration used in their comparative 
research. This was done on purpose so as to stress the international 
character of the rules which are intended to be independent from any 
specific legal domestic system. 69 
64 Bonell, note 45, at 1129 
65 ibid 
66 ibid 
67 Where the CISG pronounced general rules of contract law which were not specific 
to sales, the UNIDROIT drafters did not hesitate to refer to them literally, for 
instance, in the domain of formation and interpretation of contracts. 
68 See enumeration of the different points of reference given by Bonell, note 45, at 
1130 
69 Berger, note 34, at 218 
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IL How the UNIDROIT Principles differ from the CISG 
When UNIDROIT embarked on the elaboration of its Principles in 1980, 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
UNCITRAL, had just published the Vienna Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG), which was to provide uniform 
rules applying to international sales. The most striking difference 
between the two set of rules is the non-binding character of the 
UNIDROIT rules. A contract will only be governed by them if the 
parties have agreed to either include the Principles in the contract; or to 
submit their dispute to an arbitrator who, unlike a conventional judge, is 
not bound to apply only national legal systems to a dispute. 70 The CISG, 
however, if it has been ratified by a state, is binding for the international 
f . . al 71 contracts o its nat10n s. 
Given the obvious success of the CISG, the question arises as to why 
there was a need to create some more unified rules. The short answer is: 
to create a better set of rules. 72 
One significant improvement lies in the way in which the two set of rules 
were drafted. The CISG has often been criticised for being one-sided and 
disadvantageous to politically and economically weaker parties. It is a 
given fact that developing countries were, and still are, suspicious with 
regard to international uniform law for they believe that the export-
orientated industrialised countries use their political weight to provide 
themselves with numerous advantages under the guise of apparently 
neutral rules. 73 
Thus the way in which the Principles were drafted incorporates an 
element of fairness into international uniform law. The members of the 
Working Group did not participate in the process as representatives of 
their respective governments, but only in their role as legal experts. It 
follows that there was no need to adopt diplomatic solutions and to 
70 However, the parties' freedom to have their contractual relationship governed by 
the Principles depends on whether the domestic legal system allows the otherwise 
applicable law to be displaced. 
7 Unless its application has been excluded by the parties according to Article 6 
CISG. 
72 The members of the Working Group took some of the provisions of the CISG into 
their Principles without any modification. Where it was held that there might be a 
better solution to an issue, they included improved provisions. 
73 Diedrich, note 29, at 411 
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disguise deep and lasting political oppos1t1on with a compromise 
formula
74
, as it had been the case during the creation of the CISG. 75 
Another weak point of the CISG is its inflexibility that is not suited to 
the dynamic world of business. Conventions are created by diplomatic 
negotiations and stay in force in the form in which they have been 
drafted. Changing their content requires difficult negotiations among tbe 
member states. The Principles, however, can be adapted to new 
developments or new techniques in the area of international trade law at 
any time and without any formal requirements. 
The UNIDROIT Principles cover all kinds of transactions arising out of 
international commercial relations, whereas the scope of application of 
the CISG is restricted to contracts of purchase and sale only.76 
Considering the wide ambit of the Principles, as evidenced in the 
preamble, it seems that in international contract law the Principles might 
adopt the role that on a domestic level in civil law jurisdictions is played 
by the rules on obligations and contracts in general vis-a-vis those rules 
applicable to specific types of contracts77. It is even possible that, in the 
future, the Principles might constitute the centrepiece of international 
conventions on commercial: contracts.78 
ID. The purpose followed by the drafters of the Principles 
Even if the Principles are not intended to be a binding instrument, they 
could still be of great value to the international business world in 
different respects as evidenced by the words of their preamble. They set 
out the general rules for international commercial contracts. 
The international character of a contract is not expressly defined by the 
Principles. They aim to avoid the inconveniences caused by applying a 
domestic law system to an international contract and their intrinsic aim is 
to preclude easy resort to the domestic law indicated by the conflict of 
74 AM.Garro, The Gap-filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International 
Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay between the Principles and the CISG, 
69 (1995) Tulane Law Review 1149, at 1160 
75 Viejobueno -has-commented on the disparities between the countries taking part in 
the creation of the convention in ber article, note 2, at 203-226. 
76 Garro, note 74, at 1152 and 1163 
77 loc.cit. at 1155 
78 Such as contracts of carriage by sea or air, marine or air insurance or banking 
transactions. 
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law rules of the forum. The assumption is that the notion of international 
contract should be understood in the broadest possible sense so as 
"ultimately to exclude only those situations where no international 
element at all is involved, i.e. where all the relevant elements of the 
contract in question are connected with one country only." 79 
The same applies to the definition of commercial. The restriction does 
not repeat the distinction made between civil and commercial parties as 
this occurs in several civil law systems. It is only there to exclude the so-
called consumer transactions from the scope of the Principles. These 
transactions are increasingly subject to specific, mostly mandatory, rules 
in many legal systems. This means that apart from those consumer 
transactions the Principles apply to all kinds of economic transactions. 80 
According to the drafters, the Principles should serve as rules of law 
governing the contract if the parties wish them to do so, or if they intend 




If the parties expressly choose the Principles to govern their contract, the 
effects of this choice will, to a large extent, depend on whether they did 
so in the context of an arbitration agreement, or whether they wished to 
have their disputes settled by a national court. Whereas it seems to be 
well recognised in the field of commercial arbitration that the Principles, 
as part of the modem lex mercatoria, can govern international 
contracts82, it is questionable whether national courts in international 
commercial disputes are entitled to refer to non-national sets of rules on 
which to base their decision. National courts are bound to apply the 
conflict of law rules which, in principle, do not allow the parties to select 
non-national rules to govern their contract. Hence, before a state court, a 
reference by the parties to the Principles will generally be a mere 
agreement to incorporate them in the contract. The judge will only 
consider the Principles as long as they do not affect the rules of the 
applicable law from which the parties must not derogate. 
79 Comment on the Preamble of the Principles, Internet: 
http:llwww.unidroit.-orglenglishlprincip/es/chapter-O:htm at-p.l 
8° Comment on the Preamble, previous note, at p. l 
81 ibid, second and third paragraph. 
82 The rules will nevertheless be subject to those mandatory rules of the forum that 
are applicable, irrespective of the fact that the contract is governed by foreign law. 
See Article 1.4 
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Even if the Principles are not called upon to govern the contract itself, 
they might still be helpful for a judge or arbitrator when it comes to 
filling gaps that might have been left open by the otherwise applicable 
domestic law. Whenever it proves extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to establish the relevant rule of domestic law (for instance, where a 
question of applying a foreign domestic law and ascertaining the precise 
content of this law arises, this would involve considerable and 
disproportionate efforts or costs), judges and arbitrators might refer to 
the Principles to obtain an appropriate solution to the dispute in 
question. It has to be stressed, however, that it should be seen as a last 
83 resort only. 
Furthermore, the Principles are considered a means of interpreting and 
supplementing existing international instruments. Most international 
conventions are of fragmentary character only, and, in the case of most 
uniform laws, no common interpreting practice among the different 
member .states exists. 84 
Traditionally whenever the courts could not define the precise scope of a 
rule or found out that the international instrument did not contain a 
provision, they referred to their lex fori or to the rules of the system of 
law that would have been applicable in the absence of the uniform law. 
This method has been harshly criticised, for it entails different results 
depending on which court decides the case and therefore undermines the 
idea of obtaining identical results by applying rules of uniform law. The 
new tendency aims at an autonomous interpretation and gap-filling, and 
the Principles could serve as a guideline to help the judges find an 
adequate solution. 
The Principles could also help those domestic legislators who either have 
to create a body of law applicable to commercial contracts, or who need 
to update their law. On an international level, the Principles could 
constitute a considerable point of reference for the drafting of new 
conventions in the field of commercial law. 
83 Applying such a balanced international set of rules still appears to be more 
equitable to the parties than the traditional practice of the courts which is to simply 
apply the lex fori and thus have recourse to a legal system that usually is familiar to 
one of the parties only. See comment on the Preamble, note 79, at p.3 
84 Even though in most conventions there are provisions requiring uniformity of 
application and that regard should be had to their international character when 
interpreting the convention. See, for example, Article 7 para.{l) of the CISG. 
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IV. THE EXPERIENCES OF THE FIRST TWO YEARS 
A survey conducted by the UNIDROIT secretariat in 1996 evidenced the 
"more than favourable reception of the Principles in the international 
business and legal community". 85 This survey seems to counterargue the 
view of sceptical observers who had held that the creation of the 
Principles was little more than an academic exercise of no practical 
utility. 
86 
The results of the survey show that not only several countries 
throughout the whole world have already made reference to the 
Principles as a source of inspiration in their more recent codifications. 87 A 
large proportion of the respondents to the Secretariat's questionnaire 
indicated that they had used the Principles as the law governing the 
contract, or had at least referred to the rules in court in support of a 
particular argument. In addition, the Principles have gained considerable 
importance in a field un-foreseen by the drafters; that of using the 
Principles as a guide in contract negotiations. This has become one of the 
most important ways in which the rules are referred to in practice. One 
of the main assets of the Principles is that they will eventually exist in 17 
different languages, making them widely accessible. Furthermore, there 
are several arbitral awards and even one decision by a state court using 
the Principles to fill a gap or to demonstrate that a particular solution 
provided for by the applicable domestic law conforms to internationally 
accepted standards. 
85 M.J. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles in Practice -The Experience of the First 
Two Years, Internet: http:/ /www. unidroit.orglenglishlprincipleslpr-exper.htm 
05/14/98 at p. I: It should nevertheless be noted that the Secretariat bases its 
conclusion on a relatively small number of replies. However, the number of persons 
taking part in a survey is often only a small portion of the group of concerned people 
altogether, so that it might be assumed that the actual number of persons using the 
Principles is actually far higher. 
86 C. Kessedjian, Un exercice de renovation des sources du droit des contrats du 
commerce international: Les Principes proposes par l'Unidroit, 1995 Revue critique 
de droit international prive at 641 et seq.; R Hill, A Businessman's View of the 
UNIDROIT Principles, in 13 (1196) Journal oflnternational Arbitration 163 et seq., 
both cited in Bonell, see previous footnote 
87 Such as Quebec, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the German 
Commission for the Revision of the law of obligations, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech 
Republic, the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business law in Africa and many 
more. 
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PART THREE: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND SOlJTH AFRICAN 
CONTRACT LAW 
The Principles ate not intended to be binding and therefore do not 
constitute an ·instrument of international law which South Africa can 
adhere to. The Principles should only be applied by virtue of their 
. h . 88 persuasive aut onty. 
South African writers do not explicitly express their opinion on whether 
the parties are entitled to choose a non-national system of rules as the 
"law" governing their contract. Yet, it can be inferred from their 
discussion on the topic of party autonomy, in which no mention is made 
of this issue, that they did not consider the idea of applying non-national 
rules at all. 89 However, even if the Principles can not be taken into 
account by the national courts, they can still play a role in arbitration 
agreements where they are widely referred to. 
Let us consider the Principles and the impact their application would 
have on South African traders with respect to the general aspects of the 
contract, such as its formation and validity, as well as performance and 
breach of performance. 
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(1) INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT 
The Principles deal with this question in chapter 4. Article 4.1 concerns 
the interpretation of a contract, whereas Article 4.2, literally taken from 
Article 8 of the CISG, provides the rules for the interpretation of 
statements, or other conduct, made by one of the parties. Para.(1) of the 
Articles 4.1 and 4.2 stipulate that the conduct in question, or the 
contract as a whole, should be interpreted according to the intention of 
the parties. This suggests a subjective approach90, which in the case of 
88 See the comment on their Preamble, note 79, at 2 
89 J. Forsyth, Private International Law, 3rd edition, 1996, at 276; E. Kahn, 
International Contracts, Businessman's Law, several editions of 1990 and 1991 
90 In consequence, a term may be given a meaning which differs from both the literal 
sense of the words and the meaning a reasonable person would attach to it, provided 
that this intention was common to the parties at the time of conclusion of the 
contract. See the comment on Article 4.1, internet: 
http://www. uni droi t. orglenglishlpri nci ples/chapter-4. htm 
------------~ ...-,-,----------· _______ __, 
and Van der Linden in the 19th century which provided: "In agreements should we 
consider what was the general intention of the contracting parties rather than follow 
the literal meaning of the words." The rule is cited in RH. Christie, The Law of 
Contract in South Africa, 1996, Durban, at 228 
r 
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unilateral statements or conduct of a party is nevertheless limited by the 
requirement of knowledge or imputed knowledge of such intent by the 
other party.91 
Where intention cannot be established, the rules of para.(2) of the 
Articles 4.1 and 4.2 state that the contract or the parties' statement or 
conduct in question "shall be interpreted according to the meaning that 
reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties would give to it in the 
same circumstances". In Article 4.3, a list of such circumstances is given. 
Some of the circumstances relate to the particular relationship which 
exists between the· parties concerned, while others are of a more general 
nature. Regard should therefore be given to preliminary negotiations and 
established practices between the parties; the conduct of the parties 
subsequent to the conclusion of the contract; the nature and purpose of 
the contract; and in a more objective approach, the meaning commonly 
given to terms and expressions in the trade concerned. 
Artide 4. 4 makes it clear that "terms and expressions shall be interpreted 
in the light of the whole contract or statement in which they appear". 
· Article 4. 6 states that the contra preferentem rule is also applied in 
international contracts. 92 If one or more equally authoritative language 
versions of a contract diverge on specific points, Article 4. 7 establishes 
the pre-eminence of the version in which the contract was originally 
drawn up. Lastly, Article 4.8 provides a guideline for judges on how to 
deal with omitted terms that are important in determining the rights and 
duties of the parties concerned. 
In Roman-Dutch law, the legal position on the interpretation of contracts 
is far from clear. Although many judges believe93 that the general 
approach is to determine the intention of the parties94 ( and thereby seem 
to support a purely subjective theory), others are reluctant to consider 
subjective criteria and apply the so-called Golden Rule created by Lord 
91 Article 4.2 para(l) at the end . 
92 "If contract terms supplied by one party are unclear, an interpretation against that 
m1rty is preferred." 
3 See D.J. Joubert, General Principles of the Law of Contract, Cape Town, at 59 
note 14 
94 By this, they follow the first of rule of interpretation of contracts set up by Pothiers 
and Van der Linden in the 19th century which provided: "In agreements should we 
consider what was the general intention of the contracting parties rather than follow 
the literal meaning of the words." The rule is cited in RH. Christie, The Law of 
Contract in South Africa, 1996, Durban, at 228 
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Wensleydale in Grey v. Pearson95 . The judge held that "intention is 
ambiguous" and restricted the interpretation of the contract to the 
language and meaning of the words. As a consequence, many conflicting 
dicta have been made by South African courts since then. 
However, even if some judges seem to refer to the subjective approach 
by stressing the importance of the intention of the parties, and thereby 
stand in contradiction to the objective Golden rule, this is not the case. 
On closer examination, it becomes clear that the statements were mostly 
taken out of their context and therefore misinterpreted. In fact, even 
those judgements follow the Golden rule. 
The legal position in South African law therefore appears to be the 
following: the common intention of the parties is the prevailing criterion 
by which the contract is interpreted, but the evidence relating to the 
intention is limited to the meaning of the words and symbols that were 
used by the parties when concluding the contract. 96 Although this view is 
shared by adherents of the two competing theories, there are 
nevertheless discrepancies as to how this rule is applied in practice. 
Supporters of the subjective approach conclude that although the judge 
should consider the wording of a contract, he is nonetheless entitled to 
depart from their literal meaning where it is clear that the common 
intention of the parties is not reflected by the wording. Supporters of the 
objective, Golden Rule approach, attach such importance to the meaning 
of the words that, in at least two cases, they went so far as to hold that 
the literal sense of .the wording should be applied even though the 
wording contradicted the common intention of the parties. 97 
This controversy in South African law makes it difficult to ascertain what 
changes the application of the Principles would imply. In sum, South 
African law appears to be consistent with the provisions of the 
Principles. 98 In addition, they may at least provide a clear rule. This 
95 (1857) 10 ER 1216, 1234 
96 See Joubert, note, 93, at 59; Christie, note 94, at 229, and the cases he refers to in 
footnote 232. 
97 Van Pletsen v. Henning 1913 AD 82 99; Union Government v. Smith 1935 AD 
232 240-1 
98 The contra preferentem rule of Article 4.6, as well as the rule that a word or clause 
have to interpreted in the context of the contract as a whole are also applied under 
South African law. See Christie, note 93, at 233 note 263 
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would be a considerable contribution to legal certainty in Roman-Dutch 
law and could thus be deemed an improvement with respect to the actual 
legal position. 
(2) FORM OF THE CONTRACT 
· The Principles do not require a written contract. 99 This seems 
particularly appropriate in the context of international trade where 
transactions are concluded at great speed and are usually not paper-
based. 
100 
The provision was literally taken from Article 11 of the CISG. 
However, the CISG recognises that in certain circumstances, the parties 
need to conclude a contract in writing. 101 Even if this is not mentioned in 
the text of the Principles, their drafters admit that the principle of 
freedom of form may be overridden by national laws or international 
instruments that impose special requirements as to form. 102 Articles 2.13, 
2.17 and 2.18 illustrate this. Furthermore, Article 1.4 provides that 
mandatory rules (whatever their source) which are applicable according 
to the relevant rules of private international law, prevail over any 
inconsistent provision of the Principles. 
In South African law, in general, there is no requirement of form 
. h 103 nl h . ifi . . 104 h . e1t er , u ess t ere 1s a spec c statute to unpose 1t , or t e parties 
themselves wish to have their contract concluded in a special form. 105 
Roman-Dutch law is therefore in compliance with the provisions of the 
Principles concerning formal requirements as to contracts. 
99 Article 1.2 
10° Comment by UNIDROIT on Article 1.2, internet, note 90 101 Article 12 CISG; This is due to the fact that there was no consensus to be reached 
between countries from Eastern Europe and the Western industrialised countries. 
Since the drafters of the Principles did not have to take into account political issues 
th~ could opt for the solution which, in their opinion, was the best one. 102 See comment on Article 1.2, note 90 103 In Goldblatt v Fremantle 1920 AD 123 128, it was held: "Subject to certain 
exceptions, mostly statutory, any contract may be verbally entered into; writing is not 
essential to contractual validity." 104 e.g. Section 2 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981, and the Credit 
Agreements Act 75 of 1980, contracts of donation in terms of which performance is 
due in the future, atenupial contracts and suretyship. See P. Havenga, General 
Principles of Commercial Law, Cape Town, Wetton, Johannisburg 1992, at 98, and 
Christie, note 94, at 119 et seq. 
105 J.P.A Swanepoel, Introduction to Mercantile Law, Butterworth 1984, at 51; 
Ng'ong'ola I, note 2, at 847; Havenga, note 104, at 97 
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(3) USAGES AND PRACTICES 
The Principles extend party autonomy to the incorporation of usages and 
practices into the contract. 106 In addition, para.(2) provides that the 
parties are even bound (irrespective of their expressed or implied 
consent), by the usages that are "widely known and regularly observed in 
international trade by parties in the particular trade concerned except 
where the application of such a usage would be unreasonable". Article 
1. 8 reflects the rule of Article 9 CISG, but the drafters decided to 
supplant the requirement for actual or imputed knowledge by the parties, 
as required in Article 9 para.(2), with the more abstract and vague 
expression of "where the application of such a usage would be 
reasonable". 107 
To give an account of the legal position of South African law pertaining 
to this point, a distinction has to be drawn between usage and custom. 
The Principles do not give any definition of this term, but in the case of 
the CISG, it has been held that usage and custom are not necessarily 
coincident. 108 
Roman-Dutch law acknowledges that a usage, unlike a custom109, need 
not have existed for a long time. A usage can be introduced in a contract 
even if one of the parties ignores its existence, "provided that it is shown 
to be universally and uniformly observed within the particular trade 
concerned, long-established, notorious, reasonable and certain and does 
not conflict with positive law ... or with the clear provisions of the 
contract."110 The legal position of South African law is therefore 
consistent with the provisions of the Principles with respect to usages 
and practices. 
106 Article 1.8 para.(l): "The parties are bound by any usage to which they have 
a61eed and by any practices which they have established between themselves." 1 The explanations given by the commentators on the Principles can not give any 
further clarity with respect to this rule either. Regard has to be had to the "particular 
conditions in which one or two parties operate and/or the atypical nature of the 
transaction." See comment on Article 1.8., internet, note 90 
108 Ng'ong'ola I, note 2, at 846 
109 A custom is a "particular rule which has existed. .. from time immemorial and 
obtained the force of law in a particular locality although contrary to, or not 
consistent with, the general common law of the realm. See Christie, note 94, at 182 
110 Golden Cape Fruits Ltd v. Fotoplate Ltd, 1973 2 SA 642, at 645 
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II. FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT 
Chapter 2 of the Principles contains 22 provisions relating to the 
formation of the contract. Concluding a contract requires, as a rule, 
a,gre~me11LbY~CPJ1S~1J.t.,,oi,,~Q,J)J.JPOre • .parties. Article 2.2. states that such 
agreement can be established by acceptance of an offer, or by :conduct 
of the Qarties t@Jis_sµ..ffi~ie..nLto_show-agr.eement." Today, the same is 
accepted in South Afiican law. Whereas older authorities,went so far to 
- - ~ :.:._:-~~~;.~~-
say that "~ry contract consists of an_offer ... made,.,by_o_n_y_P,yty_!Ild 
accepted~bY~the~other"
111
, il:~~.LI!elclJat.~r_tlt~t..fgnsm~,t~s_w~ .. !maag/ry 
e_.}j~eQ.~y_pffsr.....~PJ~c,e.
112 
It can be inferred from this 
statement that a contract may be entered into without an identifiable 
sequence of an offer followed by an acceptance. 
(1) THE OFFER ,-
'6rticle 2.2 defines an offer as a "proposal for concluding a contract" 
which is "sufficiently definite and indicates the intention of the offeror to 
be bound in case of acceptance." The requirement of "intention to be 
bound" helps to distinguish an offer from a mere invitation to make an 
offer addressed to other perso~ Whereas Article 14 ( 1) of the CISG, 
from which the Principles have almost literally taken this definition, 
indicates when an offer can be considered "sufficiently definite", the 
Principles do not attempt to define this criterion. Unlike the CISG, the 
Principles, omitting this definition of "sufficiently definite" expressly 
recognise the possibility of open price contracts. This can be inferred 
from Article 2.14 w}Ji~_h_acce.pJ§_!b.tid.e_a_that_a_contract_ca.n,_ be 
..£_Qncluded.exep. if the p_arties hav~~b_e[atelyJefl:~te~s~open but does 
n..Q1._e)_{clude the.essentialia,negotii;from this.
113 
This stands in clear contradiction to Roman-Dutch law of sale. Besides 
animus contrahendi, the intention to be bound by the offeree's 
· acceptance 114, Roman-Dutch law r~u_ir_es~p11_tr_a~ts.J_9Ji.a.xe~a.,&~.rtain,.or 
~~rtainable ptg_gh¥.SU~riq,e. In any_other __ ~~ • ...!b-~£Oiltrilg!Js .. deewed 
invalid. This rule was stated by Corbett JA in the case of Westinghouse 
- -· ..... 
111 Watermeyer v. Murray 1911 AD 61 70, followed by Reid Bros (SA) Ltd v. Fischer 
Bearings Co Ltd 1943 AD 232 241 
112 Estate Breet v. Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1955 3 SA 523 (A) 532E 
113 Garro, note 74, at 1169 
114 That is what distinguishes a true offer from any statement. 
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Brake & Equipment v Bilger Engineering115 and re-affinned in the more 
recent decision of Genac Properties JHB v NBC Administrators CC. 116 
Articles 2.3 to 2.5 of the Principles deal with withdrawal, revocability 
and termination of an offer. The Principles, by taking the corresponding 
provisions from the CISG, maintain the distinction drawn in their 
Articles 15 and 16 between withdrawal and revocation of an offer. 
Withdrawal can only refer to an offer that has not yet become 
effective 
117
, whereas revo.@tton_ re_lates . .to _an_effecthce_off er.. "L\.n---2..ff er 
be~-2!.!!~Leffective whenJLreaches.the .. offeree."118 Up to this moment, 
(~le _off et(!L.C@,._S!ill .with<J.rn:w..._his ~offer' .i.e. _the. withdrawal v~s Jo. reach 
the o:[er.ee~tefore.or at the same time as the offer."119 But once an offer 
has become effective, it can be rendered invalid exclusively by 
revocation. The general rule that the offeror may revoke his offer at any 
time 120, however, is permissible only. if .the~ offeree has not already 
dispatched_at1,acceptance121 . Furthennore, para.(2) of Article 2.4. can 
also prohibit the offeror from retracting the offer, by holding that an 
offer cannot be revoked if it contains an indication that it is irrevocable, 
or "if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being 
irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer." 
As to termination of an offer, Article 2.5 states that it is :Jeuninate.d 
when a...r~je,ction re.a.c.he,&~the~oJfer.Qr~.''
122 It follows that, in contrast to 
Article 2.4 para.(1) where dispatch of an acceptance is relevant, mere 
dispatch of the rejection by the offeree will not suffice to terminate the 
offer. 
In So.l!th-AfricanJa~,Jl9 _gistincJfotLi~_mllc.ie_~~e.en...~tb.dr~~al and 
2~~ of 81-]._Qff~r, and the tenns are used simultaneously. Like the 
115 1986 2 SA 555 (A) at 574B-C 
116 1992 1 SA 56 (A) at 5761-577 A 
117 Art.2.3 para.(l) and (2) 
118 Article 2.3 para.(l) 
119 Article 2.3 para.(2) 
120 This may be one of the most controversial issues in the context of the formation of 
contract. QiWQ...differep.t hasic.approache$Jareioll.9JYgd,J2y_<;:.ooJ,,!!nd.CQmmon law 
sy_stems: w»~eas common law~considers.@,offer.to ,be,revocable,.W.~-Q~ite 
~pproach is JollowedJ:,y.most.o(tlle civil law systems. ,As a _CEWP!Pmise, one of the 
approaches._w~~chose11=~~J.l1eJ?~lSic !,Ule, _whereas the _other.j~ a~p~ in the fonn of 
ex~tions/See comment on Article 2.4., internet, note 90 
4
- --
121 Article 2.4 para.(l) 
122 This is, however, only one of the casuses of termination of an offer, others being, 
for instance, revocation (Article 2.4) or lapse of time (Article 2.7). See comment on 
Article 2.5., internet, note 90 
J 
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Principles, South Afric~ law allo,w.s_the_offe(e.e_to_reY.oke-or...w.ithdcaw 
his_Qffer at a.n,y_ti_tn~-b~fore it has been acce,p_ted.!23 Yet, there seems to 
be disagreement as to whether the relevant· moment is that of the 
acceptance becoming effective, or whether the offer ceases to be 
revocable at some earlier stage124, such as the dispatch of the 
acceptance. Even if South African law has copj_~cLthe_doctrine of 
..r.eY.ocability_ftom~EnglishJaw,,,..jLdoes~o1_seem_t9...,fgJJ9=w_the mailbox 
1JJle,_for_~the-cour,ts_favour_the __ ap_p_r_9A_c,h_that,.. ~~~!g~_s._fu.e_,,..,time .... of 
. acceIJJ.@£.~ .... ~sseley_.ant-P5 It follows that the South African legal position 
concerning this issue is that an offer can be revoked up to the time of 
acceptance. The Principles would therefore provide a solution that is 
slightly more in favour of the offeree than is the case in South African 
law. 
&oman-Dutch la~elating_to_th_e_irr.exocl!hilit.y-9i~~!LJltfeLl>b™-. a 
strong resemblance to the Principles. Even if it is unclear whether the 
offer becomes irrevocable by a unilateral declaration of the offerer, or 
whether there has to be agreement between the parties126, South African 
law recognises that an offer ~99m_elrr.e~o~cab~_tim.e_9J} 
th~gr:ounds __ oLthe_parties: intention. In addition, the offer might be 
irrevocable on the grounds of estoppel. If the offeree can prove that the 
offerer, by declaring his offer to be irrevocable, has induced him to rely 
on this statement to his own detriment, the offerer would be estopped 
from revoking his offer. 127 South African law also regards rejection of 
the offer by the offeree as termination of the offer. 128 
(2) THE ACCEPTANCE 
In Article 2.6 para.(l), an acceptance is defined as "a statement made by 
or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an offer". It is 
expressly stated that "silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to 
acceptance". Nevertheless, the drafters of the Principles acknowledge 
that the parties are perfectly free to agree on silence or inactivity to be 
expression of acceptance. 129 The_legal_po.sJtionJn~Roman:Dut_guw..,i.s 
123 Christie, note 94, at 52-3 
124 See Joubert, note 93, at 42 
125 See list of the cases by Christie, note 94, at 53, footnote 142 
126 Loe.cit.at 53-55 
127 Loe.cit.at 55 
128 Loe.cit.at 51. Other grounds for termination of an offer are, for instance, effluxion 
of fixed time, lapse of reasonable time, loss of contractual capacity, withdrawal of 
revocation and implied rejection by counter-offer. 
129 Comment on Article 2.6, internet, note 90 
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consistent with the Principles, since it reco$fiises thal,gl}~_p.fil!Y c~_2t, 
without the consent of theJa!te_r_party, take the offeree)_se~~ 
~ptance. 130 This implies that if the other party agrees on silence 
amounting to acceptance, this is considered valid. 
Para.(2) and (3) of Article 2.6 deal with the acceptance becoming 
effective. The basic rule in para.(2) is that it becomes effective "when the 
indication of assent reaches the offeror". 131 However, the offeree can 
also give his consent by performing an act due to practices established 
between the parties or usage. The time when the acceptance becomes 
effective would then be the time of performance of the act in question. In 
South African law, there exist several theories as to the time when an 
acceptance becomes effective. A survey of the cases shows that the 
prevailing one is the information theory132 ~JLpnwides that_the 
contr;:J..cLc.omes-into.being.~.t_th~Jime_and_place_where.the.offeror_l~<!DJ.S 
Qqg_e. .. A2~P!@.9e. It has to be stressed, however, that this rule is subject 
to some exceptions that are expressed or implied by the offeror. 133 In -l!_.ddit_ioI_!, there.are.special rules for offers~sent.by_po~t,-~h~<:?_Jhe !9-
~alled,_mail box or -~pet:ljtiol!. theory~takeJ1. JhmL.Engli~1L)filY .. i_s 
applied. 134 The offerer is deemed to have impliedly chosen "" - . .... .... ., 
communication of the ap_c~pt@ce __ 11:!!:P..!!gl.L.P.ost, J..,1lQ.... th~!]fu~ the 
.£2!!!!:_<1:2t js. considered to have been _g:>_1;1,cJude.cl _at _theJjm~Qf_pgstingt
5 
These two theories applied in South African law are very much criticised 
for not being suitable to the modem means of telecommunication. 136 The 
reception theory, as followed by the Principles, would be more 
advantageous with respect to this issue. 
As a consequence, the solution provided by the Principles departs clearly 
from the legal position taken by South African law, but it can be 
assumed that it would constitute a clear improvement of the matter. 
~-offer..has . .to_be_accepted. within-the_time.fixed-byJhe ... offeror, _qr 
within.a.reasonableJime if.the offeror failed to,do.so.
137 
Further rules on 
13° Collen v. Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 1 SA 413 (A) 422 
131 The risk of transmission is therefore placed on the offeree. See comment on 
Article 2.6., internet, note 90 
132 See list of authorities in Joubert, note 93, at 46, footnote 82 
133 loc.cit. at 47 
134 Ng'ong'ola I, note 2, at 851 
135 Joubert, note 93, at 48 
136 Ng'ong'ola I, note 2, at 851 
137 Article 2. 7 
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the calculation of such a fixed period of time with regard to the different 
means of communication are established in Article 2.8. An acceptance 
that reaches the offerer after the fixed period of time is without effect 
and may be disregarded by the offerer. However, a late acceptance can 
still be effective if the offerer "accepts" it despite the delay and, without 
undue delay, gives notice to the offeree. The underlying idea is that the 
offerer should be given the right to hold the offeree to the contract. 138 In 
the event that the acceptance only reaches the offerer late due to an 
unexpected delay in transmission, the drafters of the Principles held that 
the offeree, bearing alone the risk of transmission on the grounds of 
Article 2.6 para.(2), deserved protection, with the consequence that his 
acceptance is a priori considered effective. 139 Tbis,_,diffets .. dear,4,-from 
t4~!?9~filtiqn_of.Roman:;-Dutch .. law,,.,for-.ran~,qffe_r,,.,that.,is,.,nQt .. a.Q.Q~Pted~JJ. 
tim~.,!l'!:J?.te§,~o As there is nothing the offeree could accept, his conduct 
would be construed as a new offer that the offerer is free to accept or 
reject. 
Article 2.11 relates to the issue of a modified acceptance: "A reply to an 
offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, 
limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and 
constitutes a counter-offer." However, if those modifications do not 
"materially alter the terms of the offer", it is held that the reply still forms 
an acceptance", unless the offerer objects to the discrepancy''. 141 The 
provision of Article 2.11 on counter-offers was drafted according to 
Article 19 CISG, but the drafters refrained from taking over para. (3) 
which gives a list of terms that may "materially alter the terms of the 
offer". 142 UNIDROIT, by omitting such a list, wished to adopt a more 
flexible and favourable approach to the issue. 143 However, the rule in 
Article 19 para.(3) was at least clear, whereas the Principles may leave 
room for long controversies on this matter as to whether a change in the 
acceptance amounts to a material modification in the sense of Article 
2.11 para.(2) or not. 
138 see comment on Article 2.9, internet, note 90 
139 The o:fferor can nevertheless insist on the acceptance being late and thereby avoid 
conclusion of the contract. See Article 2.9 para.(2) at the end. 
140 Dietrichsen v Dietrichsen 1911 TPD 486 and Laws v. Rutherford 1924 AD 261 
141 Article 2.11 para.(2) 
142 Article 19 para.(3) CISG named, for instance, terms relating to the price, 
ff~ent, quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, etc. 
Garro, note 74, at 1167-8 
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The· concept of a counter-offer which impliedly rejects the initial offer, is 
not unknown to South African law, which also accepts that there are 
some exceptions to the main rule. 144 There does not seem to be a fixed 
range of exceptions, but as the provision of the Principles ( as it has been 
demonstrated before) only gives a vague rule without strict criteria, the 
two legal positions can be considered very similar. 
(3) MISCELLANEOUS 
There are, compared to the CISG, some new rules in the Principles that 
the drafters considered useful in the field of international contracts. 
Article 2.12, for instance, introduces the notion of writings in 
confirmation into international trade law. If one of the parties to a 
contract sends, within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the 
contract, a writing in confirmation that contains new terms, these will 
become part of the contract, "unless they materially alter the contract or 
the recipient, without undue delay, objects to the discrepancy." 
Furthermore, the Principles provide liability for losses caused to a party 
imposed upon parties who negotiate or break off negotiations in bad 
faith. 145 This provision was included in the Principles in order to 
guarantee healthy competition among business people. 146 
In Articles 2.19 to 2.22, the Principles deal with standard terms - the 
definition of which is given in Article 2.19 para.(2). It would, however, 
go far beyond the scope of this essay to examine in detail the differences 
between South African law and the Principles in this field of law. 
DI. VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT 
Unlike the CISG147, the UNIDROIT Principles contain a chapter on the 
substantive validity of contracts the regulation of which reflects public 
policy concerns of such magnitude that no international convention on 
contract law has ever dared to include them within their scope of 
application. 148 One of the most obvious difficulties is that there are 
differing domestic conceptions of the classification of the cause of 
144 Stephen v. Pepler 1921 EDL 70 andParrowv. Schneider 1951 3 SA 183 
145 Article 2.15 
146 Comment on 2.15, internet, note 90 
147 In Article 4 (a) of the CISG, its application to the validity of the contract was 
exoressly excluded. 
148 Garro, note 74, at 1173 
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action that vary between contractual remedies for non-performance and 
avoidance of the contract as a whole. The drafters of the UNIDROIT 
Principles decided to discard the substantive invalidity of the contract in 
favour of the contractual remedies, 149 in view of maintaining the 
contract. This is indicative of developments made in the law of 
international trade that focus on the preservation of the contract, as the 
inherent cost of returned or exchanged goods/currencies is undesirable in 
the international arena. 
Accepted reasons in the Principles for the invalidity of the contract are: 
gross disparity; 150 the classical defects of consent, namely fraud; 151 
threat152 and relevant mistakes. 153 In the latter case, attention has to be 
drawn to Article 3. 7, which prevents the party from avoiding the 
contract if "the circumstances on which the party relies afford, or could 
have afforded, a remedy for non-performance". Likewise, impossibility 
of performance ab initio, as well as the seller's lack of title to the 
property, do not affect the validity of the contract. 154 
(1) MISTAKE 
In order to provide a right to avoid the contract, the mere existence of a 
mistake at the time of conclusion of the contract does not suffice. There 
must be a serious mistake that must have been of such importance that a 
reasonable person in the same situation than the party would not have 
concluded the contract as such. 155 Subpara.(a) of para.(1) adds some 
conditions regarding the party other than the mistaken party. It must 
either have "made the same mistake, or caused the mistake, or knew or 
ought to have known of the mistake" and it must have been "contrary to 
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing to leave the mistaken 
party in error". In addition, the mistaken party has to prove that it did 
not act in a grossly negligent way itself, for it would be unfair to the 
other party to allow avoidance of the contract in this case. 156 The same 
149 loc.cit. at 1174 
150 Article 3.10 
151 Article 3.8 
152 Article 3.9 
153 Articles 3.4 to 3.7 
154 
Article 3.3 
155 See Article 3.5; the provision thus suggests a combined objective/subjective 
afJ'roach to assess the importance of the mistake in question. 
1 Article 3.5 para.(2)(b). See comment on Article 3.5, internet, note 90 
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applies if the mistaken party has either assumed the risk of mistake, or 
where the circumstances are such that the risk should be borne by it. 157 
The requirements for avoidance of the contract on the grounds of 
mistake in South African law are the same: the mistake must have been 
material 158, which means that if the party had been aware of the mistake 
it would not have concluded the contract159, as well as reasonable and 
justifiable.160 It becomes clear from several judgments that even if those 
two requirements are met a mistaken party cannot escape liability 
without the other party either having caused or having had knowledge of 
the mistake. 161 However, if the party that wishes to escape the contract 
has been mistaken due to its own fault, it is not considered entitled to 
rescind the contract even if it can establish that the other criteria of 
avoidance are fulfilled. 162 In the case of a common error, which, under 
the Principles, gives a right to avoid the contract, South African law 
draws the following distinction. Where there is a mistake leading the 
parties to conclude a contract that is impossible of performance, the 
contract is considered void ab initio. But in principle, a common mistake 
of law has no effect on the validity of the contract163 . It only gives the 
parties a right to rectify the contract. However, the general ideas of 
South African law and the Principles as regards avoidance of contract for 
mistake seem to be consistent. 
(2) THREAT 
Relating to threat, the position of the Principles can be reconciled with 
the legal position of South African law as well. 
Threat itself is not sufficient to entitle the threatened party to avoidance 
of the contract. There is broad consensus as to the requirements of 
imminence and unlawfulness of the threat. According to Article 3.9 of 
the Principles, the threat must have been unjustified and of so imminent 
and serious a character that the threatened party was left no reasonable 
157 see Article 3.5 para.(2)(b) 
158 National and Grindlays Bank Ltd v. Yelverton 1972 4 SA 114 117D 
159 See the wording of Article 3.5 
160 See the list of cases given by Joubert, note 93, at 83 
161 Regarding knowledge by the other party, see Diedericks v. Minister of Lands 
1964 1 SA 49 (N) 56; as to causation of the mistake by the other party, see Khan v. 
Naidoo 1989 3 SA 724 (N) 
162 See the examples given by Christie, note 94, at 354 
163 Joe.cit. at 369, and the cases cited in footnote 66 
33 
alternative but to conclude the contract. 164 Such threat should be 
established by applying an objective standard while taking into account 
h . f h . d" "d 1 165 t e circumstances o t e m 1vi ua case. 
In South African law, however, it is not clear whether the approach 
applied to evaluate the reasonableness of fear should be an objective or 
subjective one. A review of the cases reveals that there are judgments in 
support of both theories. Some refer to the "mind of a person of ordinary 
firmness"166 or "reasonable fear"167, whereas others follow the subjective 
theory which held that there was no universal objective standard. 168 
As to the object of threat, it seems to be clear in South African law today 
that the threat must be exerted towards a party or his family. In case of 
threat to property only, there can be a right to rescind the contract, but 
there is a requirement of protest. 169 As a result, the contract is not 
deemed void ab initio, but voidable at the option of the innocent 
170 party. 
The language of Articles 3. 8 and 3. 9 also speaks in favour of such a 
conclusion. By stating that a party "may" avoid the contract. This 
suggests that the threatened party can also opt in favour of its existence. 
But the Principles are much broader as to the object of the threat. It 
suffices that threat affects purely economic interests or reputation of the 
. 171 parties. 
(3) FRAUD 
In the case of fraud, unlike mistake and threat, such conduct is 
considered so reprehensible in nature that it is a sufficient ground for 
avoidance by itself without the need for the presence of any additional 
conditions. 172 According to the Principles, it therefore suffices to 
establish that the fraudulent non-disclosure of circumstances, which, 
according to reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, should 
164 
Article 3.9 
165 Comment on Article 3.9, internet, note 90 
166 , 
White Bros. v. Treasurer-General (1883) 2 SC 322 351 
167 
Kruger v. Sekretaris van Binnelandse Inkomste 1973 I SA 394 (C) 397H 
168 
Block v. Dogon Dreier & Co. 1910 WLD 330, and Savvides v. Savvides 1986 2 
SA325 (T) 
169 
Kapp v. TC Valuta 1975 3 SA 283 (T) 
17° Christie, note 94, at 345-6 
171 Comment on Article 3.9, internet, note 90 
172 Comment on Article 3.8, internet, note 90 
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have been revealed, has induced the defrauded party to enter in the 
contract. 173 
In South African law, a party who has been induced to conclude a 
contract by the misrepresentation of an existing fact is entitled to rescind 
the contract provided the misrepresentation was material, intended to 
induce the innocent party and eventually did so. 174 However, if the 
misrepresentation was fraudulent the contract is never treated as binding 
on the innocent party175 and the innocent party is even entitled to 
damages. 
The legal positions as to fraud seems to be consistent, as both the 
Principles and South African law consider fraud by one party and thereby 
inducing the other to enter into a contract as being a legal ground for 
avoiding the contract without the need for anything more. The fraudulent 
party is in both cases liable for damages. 176 
IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE PARTIES 
Chapter 6 of the Principles dedicates 20 articles to the issue of 
performance. Articles 6.1.1 to 6.1.17 describe the way in which 
performance is to be rendered, whereas Articles 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 deal with 
hardship. 
South-African law, for the most part, seems to be consistent with the 
Principles' provisions on performance. 
(1) PLACE OF PERFORMANCE 
Whereas the Principles provide a clear rule in this respect, the position of 
South African law appears rather confusing. 
The Principles' rules are based on the assumption that, in most cases, the 
place of performance will be determined by an express term of the 
contract or will at least be determinable from it. As a consequence, they 
173 See Article 3.8 
174 Uni-Erections v. Continental Engineering 1981 1 SA 240 (W) 245E which is in 
line with several older authorities listed by Christie, note 94, at 301 note 1 
175 Estate Schickerling v. Schicklering 1936 CPD 269 274-6 
176Article 3.18 
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provide supplementary rules for those cases where the contract remains 
silent on the matter. 
Article 6.1.6 para.(1) of the Principles lays down the general rule that a 
party is to perform its obligations at its own place of business. Only in 
the case of monetary obligations is the obligor to perform at the 
obligee's place of business. 
In South African law, the place of performance is the one which has been 
agreed upon by the parties, either expressly or tacitly. Thus customs 
silently incorporated in the contract may serve as a guideline for the 
determination of the proper place of performance. 177 In the absence of 
any designation, the place of performance would depend entirely upon 
the circumstances. 178 Where specific movables have to be delivered, 
tender to the obligee has to be made at the place where they were at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract. Things still having to be 
manufactured or produced are to be delivered at the place of 
manufacture or production. Unascertained things, as well as money 
debts, are subject to the a legal regime which is not easy to discern. 
There is no room for a general or residual rule, 179 since Roman-Dutch 
authorities are conflicting on this point, and many differing circumstances 
have to be taken into account. The only ascertainable rule used to be that 
the creditor had to seek out the debtor when they had different 
domiciles. When they had the same domicile, it was on the debtor to 
seek out and pay the creditor. 180 Today the question as to where 
performance has to take place seems to be closely linked to the concept 
of mora debitoris. If a time has been fixed for performance the debtor 
has to seek out the creditor in order to avoid falling into mora debitoris. 
But where no time has been expressly or tacitly included in the contract, 
it is upon the creditor to go to the debtor's place. 181 
If the Principles were applied in transactions between South African and 
citizens from another country they would provide a much clearer rule 
without restraining the parties' freedom to make any other arrangement. 
177 Gold.fields Confectionary and Bakery (Pty.) Ltd v Norman Adam (Pty) Ltd 1950 2 
SA 763 (T) 
178 Joubert, note 93, at 281 
179 Christie, note 94, at 479 
180 Joubert, note 93, at 281 and 282 
181 Taboryski v Schwarzer and Aperion NO 1917 WLD 152; Goldfiels Confectionary 
and Bakery Co. (Pty) Ltd v Norman Adam (Pty) Ltd 1950 2 SA 763 (T) 
... 
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(2) TIME OF PERFORMANCE 
Article 6.1.1 of the Principles distinguishes three situations. Where the 
contract itself stipulates a precise time or period of time or makes it at 
least determinable, performance has to be rendered at this time or at any 
time within that fixed period. In the absence of any fixed or determinable 
time of performance, performance is due within a reasonable time after 
the conclusion of the contract in the circumstances. 
This is very similar to South African law, which underlines that 
determination by the parties of the time of performance is predominant. 
If there is no such agreement, performance will be due within a 
reasonable time as well. 182 
(3) EARLIER PERFORMANCE 
The two systems do not share the same approach. The Principles state 
that "the obligee may reject an earlier performance unless it has no 
legitimate interest in doing so"183 . Thus the basic rule is that the debtor is 
not entitled to tender his performance before maturity. Since the 
Prinicples are based on the idea that the time set for performance is 
geared to the obligee's activities earlier performance may cause him 
inconvenience and are deemed to constitute non-performance of the 
contract. 184 In exceptional cases, the creditor may not be allowed to 
refuse earlier performance. If his legitimate interest in timely 
performance does not become apparent to the debtor or if the earlier 
performance does not cause him any significant harm, he will have to 
accept such performance. 185 
In South African law, however, future dates for performance are usually 
deemed fixed for the benefit of the debtor. Whenever there is doubt as to 
whether a time clause in a contract operates in the interest of the creditor 
or the debtor it is assumed to be in the interest of the debtor. 186 It 
follows as a rule that the debtor can anticipate his performance. 187 An 
exception occurs only where the future date has been fixed entirely or 
182 Mackey v Naylor 1917 TPD 530 537-8; Nel v Cloete 1972 2 SA 150(A) 169G 
183 Art. 6.1.5 para.(l) 
184 Comment by UNIDROIT on Article 6.1.5, internet, note 90 
185 ibid 
186 Bernitz v Euvrard 1943 AD 595 
187 Western Bank Ltd v Hamond 1975 2 SA 625 (T); Dodd v Bester 1984 1 SA 355 
(D); Chandony v Fisheries Development Corporation of South Africa 1985 4 SA 700 
(N) 
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partly for the benefit of the creditor. 188 In this case, the legal position is 
similar to the position under the Principles. 
(4) PARTIAL PERFORMANCE 
Both, the Principles and South African law, generally consider partial 
performance as a breach of performance and entitle the obligee to refuse 
an offer by the obliger to perform in part at the time when performance 
is due. 189 The Principles contain limits to this rule insofar as the obligee 
is not entitled to reject partial performance if his legitimate interest in 
receiving full performance is not apparent and where temporary 
·11 . "fi h hi 190 acceptance w1 not cause any s1gru cant arm to m. 
Similarly, South African law accepts the idea that there are cases where 
the obligee is not authorised to reject performance in part. Only if the 
performance is indivisible there is a defective performance allowing the 
obligee to resort to the available remedies. 191 In the case of a divisible 
performance, the defence that the contract has not been performed can 
only be raised in respect of the part of the performance that has not been 
fulfilled. 192 Yet this does not seem to apply to a performance which 
consists in the payment of money. In Shapiro v. Berry, 193 the court held 
that the creditor was not obliged to accept payment in instalments of a 
debt that is payable in full. He can legitimately refuse the tender without 
prejudicing his right to full performance. 
(5) ORDER OF PERFORMANCE 
With respect to order of performance, the Principles and South African 
law show a very similar approach. As a basic rule, the parties to a 
contract are bound to render their performances simultaneously. 194 
188 Bernitz v Euvrard 1943 AD 595 
189 Art. 6.1.3 of the Principles, Joubert, note 93, at 232 and Christie, note 93, at 
449; In relation with the payment of money, see Shapiro v Berry 1933 WLD 112 
19° Comment by UNIDROIT on Article 6.1.3, internet, note 90; This is a 
consequence of the general principle of good faith and fair dealing enunciated in 
Article 1. 7. 
191 Kyte v McLeod (1891) 6 EDC 43; Scheinfeld's Trustee v Murray & Co. 1920 
CPD87 
192 Jamieson v Elsworth 1915 AD 115; SA Wood Turning Mills (Pty) Ltd v Price 
Bros (Pty) Ltd 1962 4 SA 263 (T) u.a. 
193 1933 WLD 112 
194 Art. 6.1.4 para.(1) of the Principles; in South African law this is referred to as the 
principle of reciprocity. 
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In South African law, there is a presumption of the common intention of 
the parties that in bilateral or synallagmatic contracts neither should be 
entitled to enforce the contract unless he has performed or is ready to 
..c. hi bl. . 195 peaorm s own o 1gat1ons. 
The Principles state the same in para.(1), but they obviously assume that, 
as a rule, either the parties will make specific arrangements or that in 
practice much will depend on usages. A distinction is drawn between 
those cases in which performances can be rendered simultaneously196 and 
in which performance of one party requires a period of time. 197 In the 
latter case, the Principles state that the performing party has to perform 
first, but recognise the fact that circumstances may frequently indicate 
the contrary. 
The remedies available to the parties are identical albeit their differing 
designations. Art. 7.1.3, which has to be read together with Art. 6.1.4, 
allows either party to withhold performance unless the other party 
tenders its performance. This rule corresponds to the civil law concept of 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus198 which is applied under South 
African law. 199 The idea is that one party can delay its performance until 
the other has performed. 200 It follows that if the creditor claims 
performance, the debtor can raise the defence of exceptio non adimpleti 
contractus and will not be condemned unless the creditor has proved that 
he has performed, is prepared to perform or is excused from 
performance. 
(6) PAYMENT BY CHEQUE OR OTHER INSTRUMENT 
The rules in this respect seem to be compatible in the two compared 
systems. 
195 Hauman v Nortje 1914 AD 293 300; Wolpert v Steenkamp 1917 AD 493 499; 
Nesci vMeyer 1982 3 SA498 (A) 513 F 
196 
197 
para.(1) of Art. 6.1.4 
para.(2) of Art. 6.1.4 
198 Comment by UNIDROIT on Article 7.1.3, internet, note 90 
199 Roman-Dutch and modern law of South Africa have accepted this principle of 
Roman law. See Joubert, note 93, at 230 and note 55. 
200 The defence can only be raised where the performances of the parties are 
reciprocal and the one is prerequisite for the other. This corresponds to the 
requirements enunciated in Art. 6.1.4 of the Principles. 
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The Principles state that payment of a monetary debt may be made in any 
form that is usual at the place of payment. 201 As a consequence, a debtor 
can freely choose how to settle his debt, as long as he makes use of a 
medium of payment that is used in the ordinary course of business at the 
place for payment. 
In South Africa, however, a creditor who is entitled to payment in legal 
tender can refuse to accept payment by means of an instrument which 
would oblige him to collect payment from another. 202 But the two rules 
seem to be different only at first sight, since, in practice, they will often 
lead to the same result. A creditor in South African law is free to accept 
such an instrument of payment, and owing to the tremendous use made 
of cheques in modem commercial life, for example, the courts would 
very easily come to the conclusion that the creditor has agreed to accept 
a cheque in payment. 203 They will do so if this can somehow be inferred 
from the contract. In the absence of anything signifying the contrary, 
only some slight indication in the contract or evidence will generally 
suffice to infer or imply that payment of the creditor can be effected by 
cheque, as this has become a widely used and recognised medium of 
payment. 204 In other cases, when payment has to be made in legal tender 
a tender of payment by cheque, if objected by the creditor, is not valid.205 
As to discharge of the money debt, it is held, both in the Principles under 
Art. 6.1.7 para. (2) and in South African law, that acceptance of a 
cheque is presumed to be on condition that it will be honoured. 206 
(7) IMPUTATION OF PAYMENTS 
In both systems, the rules relating to the imputation of payments in those 
cases where an obligor owing several monetary obligations to the same 
obligee pays a sum which can only satisfy part of the entire debt, are 
widely identical. This may be a consequence of the fact that Article 
6.1.12 of the Principles was inspired by generally recognised principles 
201 Art. 6.1.7 para.(l) 
202 Jochelson, Yamey & Co. v Mahomed 1916 TPD 233; Schneier and London v 
Chapman 1917 TPD 497; Sultan Trust v Thaker 1935 NPD 108; Esterhuyse v 
Selection Cartage (Pty) Ltd 1965 1 SA 360 (W) 
203 Schneier and London v Chapman 1917 TPD 497 
204 Esterhuyse v Selection Cartage (Pty) Ltd 1965 1 SA 360 (W) 361 
205 ibid 
206 Tregellas v Hardy & Co. 1921 CPD 352; Milner v Webster 1938 TPD 598; Bold v 
Coooper 1 SA; see also Joubert, note 93, at 281 note 67 
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and that South African law on this question has remained virtually 
h d . R . 207 unc ange smce oman tunes. 
In general, the obliger is offered the possibility of stipulating the debt to 
which he is making full or partial payment. 
208 
The Principles add that any 
expenses and interest due have to be discharged before the principal. 209 
In South African law, this question arises only where there has been no 
allocation of the debt and where the payment has to be appropriated 
according to the common law rules.210 
If the debtor is silent on the matter of allocation, the creditor may, within 
a reasonable time after payment, choose the obligation to which he 
imputes the payment received.211 The Principles require that the elected 
obligation must be due and undisputed. 212 In South African law, the 
creditor's choice is subject to similar limitations. The courts have held 
that the obligee must act equitably, and must not appropriate the 
payment to a disputed debt, or one not yet due, or a natural obligation 
not enforceable at law.213 There is a slight difference insofar as, in South 
African law, the creditor's appropriation, to be effective, must be made 
before or at the time of payment, to enable the debtor not to make it 
h d
. , 214 
upon t e ere 1tor s terms. 
It does not really become clear why this requirement should be upheld, 
since the debtor can easily avoid this consequence by appropriating the 
payment himself beforehand. 
Failing imputation by the debtor and the creditor, the payments are 
appropriated according to the same criteria, i.e. an enforceable debt 
before an unenforceable debt; an unsecured before a well-secured debt; a 
more burdensome before a less burdensome, and an older debt before a 
younger debt. The only difference is that, under the Principles, this list of 
criteria is of exclusive character and has to be strictly followed within the 
given order, whereas in South African law, those criteria seem to be of 
equal value. If none of the proceeding criteria apply, i.e. if all debts are 
207 Christie, note 94, at 475 
208 Art. 6.1.12 para.(l), and in South African law, Watermeyer's Executors v 
Watermeyer's Executor 1870 B 69 
209 Art. 6.1.12 para.(l) 
210 for authority see Joubert, note 93, at 284 note 99 
211 
212 
Art. 6.1.12 para.(2) 
Atz. 6.1.12 para.(2) 
213 See list of the cases in note 94 in Joubert, note 93, at 284 
214 Bulleid v Campbell (1904) 9 HCG 347 352 
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of the same date and equal in all other respects, the payment must be 
applied so as to discharge all debts proportionally.215 
(8) HARDSHIP 
South African law attaches considerable importance to the concept of 
pacta sunt servanda. It does, therefore, not give a party the right to 
demand modification of the contractual relationship in the face of an 
unforeseen change of circumstances. The fact that vis maior has made it 
uneconomical for a party to carry out its obligations does not mean that 
performance has become impossible for the debtor. 216 As a consequence, 
the party is still bound to perform in the way it has been agreed upon in 
the contract.217 In cases of a change of circumstances falling short of 
supervening impossibility, Christie assumes that it may often be possible 
to prove a tacit term or condition218, or that such situations may be 
avoided by including in the contract a force majeure, hardship or 
intervener clause, or to refer to arbitration. 
The Principles, on the other hand,. offer the disadvantaged party the 
possibility of requesting renegotiations from the other party. However, 
this is subject to very strict conditions. It is made clear in Article 6.2.1 
that the party is still bound to perform its obligation.219 Only where the 
supervening circumstances are such that they lead to a fundamental 
alteration of the equilibrium of the contract, either because the cost of a 
party's performance has increased or because the value of the 
performance a party receives has diminished,220 can there be hardship in 
the sense of section 6.2 of the Principles. Additionally, the requesting 
party will have to prove that ( 1) the events occured or became known to 
it after the conclusion of the contract, (2) that at that time those events 
could not reasonably have been taken into account by it and (3) were 
beyond the control of it and ( 4) that this risk was not to be assumed by 
the disadvantaged party. In this case, the disadvantaged party can 
without undue delay request renegotiations. If the parties fail to reach an 
215 The relevant authority in South African law is Wolhuter v Zeederberg (1885) 3 
HCG 437; in the Principles, the rule is stated at the end of para.(3) of Art. 6.1.12. 
216 This would mean that he would be excused from liability. 
217 See, for instance, Yodaiken v Angehrn & Piel 1914 TPD 254 260; Compagnie 
Interafricaine de Travaux v South African Transport Services 1991 4 SA 217 (A) 
218 note 94, at 526 
219 This flows from the general principle of the binding character of the contract, 
Article. 1.3 
220 see Article 6.2.2 
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agreement they can resort to the court.221 If the court holds that there is 
indeed hardship it is vested with the power to adjust the contract with a 
view to restoring its equilibrium or to terminate it. 222 
The strict approach of South African law is not appropriate to 
international transactions where unforeseen changes of circumstances 
can easily occur due to political reasons, such as war or embargos. 
Applying the Principles would provide a more flexible solution. Since 
Article 6.2.2 imposes very strict conditions, it is made sure that the 
parties could not abuse this possibility of avoiding the binding force of 
the contract. 
V. REMEDIES AGAINST BREACH OF PERFORMANCE 
Non-performance is defined in Article 7.1.1 as being the "failure by a 
party to perform any of its obligations under the contract, including 
defective or late performance". This means that the concept includes all 
forms of defective performance as well as complete failure to perform. 
Furthermore, Article 7.1.1 comprises both, non-excused and excused 
223 non-performance. 
Non-performance by a party is excused in terms of the Principles if it 
was due to an impediment beyond the control of the failing party. 224 The 
party must prove that it could not reasonably be expected to have taken 
the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract, or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences. The 
concept off orce majeure has as its only consequence that the non-
performing party is excused from liability in damages. It does not restrict 
the other party's right to terminate the contract if the non-performance is 
. fundamental, or to withhold performance.225 
The legal position of Roman-Dutch law is m accordance with this 
approach. The authorities are clear insofar as a party is discharged from 
221 Art. 6.2.3 para.(3) 
222 Art. 6.2.3 para.(4) 
223 see comment by UNIDROIT on Article 7.1.1 internet, note 90 
224 Article7.l.7para.(l) 
225 Article 7.1.7 para.(4) 
/ 
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liability if it is prevented from performing its contract by vis major or 
fi ·, 226 casus ortuz us. 
If there is a breach of performance, the remedies provided for by the 
Principles are compatible with the traditional principal remedies for 
breach of contract in Roman-Dutch law. 
Specific performance is the primary remedy in both cases, and there is 
possibility of cumulating various remedies provided that the selected 
remedies are not inconsistent and the injured party is not 
overcompensated. 227 Other important remedies are cancellation of the 
contract and damages. 
(1) SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Both systems acknowledge that the disadvantaged party is entitled to 
claim specific performance.228 In Farmers Co-op Society v Berry,229 the 
judge held that it "is against conscience that a party should have a right 
of election whether he would perform his contract or only pay damges 
for the breach of it. The election is rather with the injured party subject 
to the discretion of the court". The Principles, as opposed to common 
law systems that allow enforcement of non-monetary obligations only in 
special circumstances,230 are compatible with the South-African 
approach. However, under both systems the right to claim specific 
performance may, as an exception, be excluded. The Principles provide 
in Art. 7.2.2 that a party may not obtain specific performance if 
performance is impossible, unreasonably burdensome or expensive, of 
exclusively personal character,231 or where the party entitled to 
performance may reasonably obtain performance from another source. 
The last reason is not expressly accepted as grounds for refusing specific 
performance in South African law, but would be contained in the refusal 
226 Peters, Flamman and Co. v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427 434; Landmark v 
Van der Walt (1885) 3 SC 300 
227 Christie, note 94, at 577; this rule is not clearly expressed in the Principles, but it 
can be inferred from the comment on Article 7.4.2 where it is said that the aggrieved 
~ must not be enriched by damages for non-performance. 
28 It has to be noted that, as opposed to the CISG where specific performance was 
only a discretionary remedy that the court could refuse, specific performance is 
considered obligatory under the Principles. 
229 1912 AD 343 350 
230 see comment by UNIDROIT on Article 7.2.2, internet, note 90 
231 Enforcement of performance would interfere with the personal freedom of the 
obligor and quality of performance may be impaired. This makes clear that the 
exception does not apply to obligations undertaken by companies. See comment by 
UNIDROIT on Art. 7.2.2, internet, note 90 
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for grounds of undue hardship. Another reason for refusing specific 
performance is the failure of the injured party to require performance 
within a reasonable time after it has become aware of the non-
performance. 
In South African law, too, it is settled that, in accordance with the 
maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia specific performance may not be 
ordered if compliance with it would be impossible. 232 Undue hardship is 
also an acknowledged reason for refusing specific performance233, i.e. 
where it would operate unreasonably hard on the defendant or where 
specific performance would induce injustice or would be inequitable. 
Specific performance will also not be granted in the case of contracts for 
personal services because of the continuing nature and personal 
1 . hi . 1 d 234 re at10ns p mvo ve . 
Both, South African law and the Principles, award damages or the right 
to cancellation of the contract to the injured party if the defendant fails 
to comply with an order for specific performance. 235 
(2) CANCELLATION OF THE CONTRACT 
The positions in the Principles and in South African law concerning 
termination of the contract can easily be reconciled. 
Under the Principles, termination of the contract is available to a party 
under three different situations: if the failure of the other party to 
perform an obligation under the contract amounts to a fundamental non-
performance;236 in the event of anticipatory non-performance of a 
fundamental character;237 and, in the case of delay, if the additional 
period of time allowed to the failing party under Article 7.1.5 has expired 
without the performance having been rendered. 238 
232 Le Roux v Odendaal 1954 4 SA 498 (N) 
233 Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipalities 1951 2 SA 371 (A) 
234 Christie, note 94, at 584-5 
235 Article 7.2.5 of the Principles; authorities in South African law: Ras v Simpson 
1904 TS 254 256; Clarkv Cloete 1944 WLD 134. The judges held that the plaintiff 
may already include an alternative claim for cancellation and damages in the action 
in which he claims specific performance. 
236 Article 7.3.1 para.(1) 
237 Article 7.3.3 
238 Article 7.3.1 para.(3) in conjunction with Article 7.1.5 para~(3) 
C-
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The decision whether a party should be given the right to terminate the 
contract depends upon the weighing of a number of considerations. On 
the one hand, termination may cause serious detriment to the non-
performing party, since it may not be able to recover its expenses. On the 
other hand, the aggrieved party must have a right to rescind the contract 
if performance is rendered so late or of such bad quality that it is of no 
use it for its intended purposes. A second aspect is the behaviour of the 
non-performing party making it unreasonable for the aggrieved party to 
be compelled to the execution of the contract. 239 
The criteria as to when a failure to perform amounts to a fundamental 
non-performance under the Principles, are given in para.(2) of Article 
7.3.1. They are· intended to serve as a guideline only. The non-
performance is deemed fundamental if it substantially deprives the other 
party of what it was entitled to expect under the contract. 240 
·Furthermore, the contract may be such that strict performance may be of 
essence,241 for example, in the case of sales of commodities. If the non-
performance is intentional or reckless, this should also allow the 
aggrieved party to terminate the contract. 242 In the event of performance 
in instalments, the non-performance may give the aggrieved party reason 
to believe that it cannot rely on the future performance. In this case, the 
party also has a right to rescind the contract.
243 
In South African law, except for an express forfeiture clause in the 
contract, a party is entitled to cancel the contract under the same 
circumstances as provided for by the Principles. But even if the basic 
rules are easy to name, it is quite hard to discern their exact ambit, since 
the concepts of mora and material breach have only been gradually 
developed by the courts which still do not manage to provide clear 
criteria for them. 
First, in case of cancellation for material breach of performance, it was 
suggested that the breach was to be deemed material if the foundation of 
the contract was destroyed,244 or where the effect of the breach was such 





244 Aucamp v Morton 1949 3 SA 611(A) 620 
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as to render it purposeless to carry on under the contract. 245 The modern 
approach seems to be to judge upon the question whether the occurred 
breach goes to the root of the contract. 246 This coincides with the 
concept of fundamental breach of the Principles. 
Second, a party can cancel the contract in the event of mora if time is of 
the essence of the contract. This means that the failure to perform is 
regarded as a breach of such magnitude as to justify the other party in 
cancelling the contract. If time is not of the essence of the contract, the 
creditor would be confined to a claim for payment or specific 
performance, damages or mora interests. 247 However, under the pressure 
of commercial necessity, South African law has departed from this strict 
point of view and gives the creditor the possibility of making time of the 
essence by simple notice even when the contract does not contain a time 
for performance. 248 
Article 7.3.3 extends the aggrieved party's right to termination to those 
cases where the other party's performance is not yet due but where it is 
clear that there will be a fundamental non-performance. The most typical 
case is the party's declaration that it will not perform the contract. A 
suspicion, even a well-founded one, is not sufficient, there has to be 
clarity on this fact. If the party has only reason to believe but cannot 
establish with certainty that there will be a fundamental non-
performance, it may, in accordance with Article 7.3.4, demand adequate 
assurance of due performance from the other party. Where this assurance 
is not provided within a reasonable time, the demanding party is equally 
entitled to cancel the contract. 
As under the Principles, the innocent party can cancel the contract and 
sue for damages even before performance is due in the event of an 
anticipatory breach or repudiation. 249 But even if, in accordance with the 
doctrine of election, the innocent party is free to choose between 
enforcement of the contract and its cancellation,250 it has to do so within 
a reasonable time, otherwise it will be estopped from doing so. 
245 O'Connell v Flischman 1948 4 SA 19l(T) 194 
246 Oatorian Properties (Pty) Ltd v Maroun 1973 3 SA 779(A) 784 
247 Christie, note 94, at 564 
248 Breytenbach v Van Wijk 1923 AD 541 549 
249 Geldenhuys and Neethling v Beuthin 1918 AD 426 
250 Segal v Mazzur 1920 CPD 634 644-5 
\... 
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The right to terminate the contract, under both systems, is exercised by 
simple notice to the other party without having to refer to the court.25 1 
The notice must be clear and unequivocal, and takes effect from the time 
when the non-performing party receives it. 252 Under the Principles, the 
aggrieved party will, however, lose its right to terminate the contract if it 
does not give notice to the other party within a reasonable time after it 
has or ought to have become aware of the non-performance. 253 What is 
reasonable depends upon the circumstances. 254 
Termination of the contract releases either party from their respective 
primary obligations.255 The contract is not set aside ab initio as it is the 
case when there is rescission of the contract, but the reciprocal primary 
obligations of the parties are transformed into secondary ones. In this 
sense, either party can claim restitution of what it has supplied to the 
other, provided that such party concurrently makes restitution of 
whatever it has received. 256 Liability for damages is not affected either. 
Thus, the aggrieved party is not deprived of its right to claim damages in 
accordance with the rules laid down in section 4 of chapter 7. 257 
Furthermore, any contract provision which is to operate even after 
termination is still valid and can be enforced. 258 
Since there are no profound differences with respect to cancellation in 
both, the Principles and South African law, applying the Principles 
would, in sum, not lead to any fundamental changes but could provide 
useful clarity to the confusing rules of South African law. 
251 Article 7.3.2 para.(l); Swart v Vosloo 1965 1 SA 100 (A) 105G; Longhorn Group 
~) Ltd v The Fedics Group (Pty) Ltd 1995 3 SA 836 (W) 841G 
5 Comment by UNIDROIT on Article 7.3.2, internet, note 90; for South African 
law, see previous note 
253 Article 7.3.2 para.(2) 
254 Comment by UNIDROIT on Article 7.3.2 p.4 
255 Article 7.3.5 para.(l) 
256 Article 7.3.6 para.(l) . 
257 Article 7.3.5 para.(2); Under South African law, the non-performing party is still 
bound to pay damages as well, see Atteridgeville Town Council v Livanos 1992 1 SA 
296 (A) 3031 - 306C 
258 Article 7.3.5 para.(3) 
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(3) DAMAGES 
Any non-perfonnance except where it is excused under the Principles259 
gives the other party a right to damages either exclusively or in 
conjunction with any other remedies. 260 The right to damages arises from 
the sole fact of non-perfonnance, which means, in particular, that it is 
not necessary for the aggrieved party to prove that the non-perfonnance 
was due to the fault of the non-performing party. It suffices to establish 
that it has not received what it was promised. The right to damages may 
also arise during the pre-contractual period in the event of mistake, 
fraud, threat, gross disparity261 or in case of negotiations in bad faith262 
or breach of the duty of confidentiality.263 
The provisions of 7.4.2 to 7.4.4 embody the principle oflimitation of the 
recoverable harm. The aggrieved party is only entitled to damages for 
harm that is causally linked with the non-perfonnance, certain and 
foreseeable. It follows that compensation is due only for hann that is 
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty,264 and was or could 
reasonably have been foreseen by the non-perfonning party at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract as being likely to result from its non-
perfonnance. 265 
The situation is fairly the same in South African law. Damages will not 
be awarded on presumption, but the plaintiff has to prove that the other 
party has committed a breach of contract out of which he has suffered a 
loss that the non-performing party can be held responsible for. He also 
has to establish the extent of that loss. 266 However, where it is clear that 
some damages have been sustained by a plaintiff, but that it is impossible 
or prohibitely expensive to produce evidence of the exact amount of 
loss, the court must endeavour to arrive at some amount which will meet 
the justice of the case. 267 It should award a sum that appears fair and 
reasonable in the circumstances. 268 If the plaintiff cannot prove the 
259 In the case of force majeure, Article 7.1. 7, or of an exemption clause, Article 
7.1.6 
260 Article 7.4.1 
261 Article 3.18 
262 Article 2.15 
263 Article 2.16 
264 Article 7.4.3 
265 Article 7.4.4 
266 See, for example, Bhayroo v Van Aswegen 1915 TPD 195; Jayber (Pty) Ltd v 
Miller 1980 4 SA 280 (W) 
267 Stolte v Tietze 1928 SW A 51 52 
268 Fouche v Olivier 1929 GWL 27 31-2 
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damage he claims to have sustained, South African courts, unlike English 
courts, are not entitled to award nominal damages, except for the 
purpose of establishing the plaintiffs rights. 269 The Principles remain 
silent with regard to this issue. 
As to the limitation of the non-performing party's liability, it is clear in 
South African law as well that there must be a causal link between the 
breach of contract and the suffered harm. 27° Furthermore, the non-
performing party cannot be held liable for all consequential harm flowing 
from its breach. A distinction is drawn between general and special 
damages. The notion of general damages corresponds to the concept of 
foreseeable harm as it is used by the Principles. South African law also 
limits the debtor's liability to the loss which he did actually foresee and 
which he must have foreseen271 at the time the contract was entered into. 
Special damages can be claimed only in accordance with the so-called 
convention principle which is highly disputed, but seems to be presently 
part of the South African law. 272 It is thus not sufficient that the damages 
were in the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting, but 
the debtor must have contracted to pay the damages concerned. 273 Since 
this principle will often lead to special damages not being awarded in 
cases where it would generally be thought fair to award them, there is a 
lot of criticism urging to jettison the convention principle in favour of 
the contemplation principle.214 
Under the Principles, the aggrieved party is entitled to full compensation, 
including loss of profit and non-pecuniary harm, such as pain and 
suffering, aesthetic prejudice, as well as harm resulting from attacks on 
honour or reputation. 275 In South African law, it is also held that the 
aggrieved party should be placed in the position it would have been in if 
the contract had been properly performed, provided that this can be done 
by the payment of money and without undue hardship to the defaulting 
269 This has been the actual legal situation since Farmers' Co-op Society (Reg) v 
Berry 1912 AD 343 
270 Dhooma v Mehta 1957 1 SA 676 (D); Svorinic v Biggs 1985 2 SA 573 (W) 
271 See the whole series of cases listed in Joubert, note 93, at 252 note 237 
272Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A) 554C; Holmdene 
Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Robers Construction Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 670 (A) 688A 
273 Christie, note 94, at 607-8 
274 loc.cit. at 608-9 
275 Comment by UNIDROIT on Article 7.4.2, internet, note 90 
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party. 276 However, the courts are concerned exclusively with patrimonial 
loss and take no account of intangible loss. In this respect, South African 
law has not followed the English approach. A series of cases in which it 
had been held that damages could be awarded for inconvience, 
discomfort or loss of time, was overruled by the decision in 
Administrator, Natal v EdouarcP-77 . The Appellate Division held that 
contractual damages must be confined strictly to patrimonial loss, an 
extension to intangible loss having to be implemented by legislation. Yet, 
it has to be borne in mind that the plaintiff is perfectly free to bring a 
delictual actio iniuriarum to claim sentimental damages.278 
The basic rule that the aggrieved party is entitled to full compensation is 
restricted by the principle that the party must not be over-compensated. 
Saved expenses and reduced cost have to be deducted from the amount 
of damages. 279 This corresponds to the rule contained in Article 7.4.2 
para.(l) of the Principles, which provides that account must be taken of 
any gain resulting to the aggrieved party from the non-performance, 
whether that be in the form of expenses which it has not incurred or of a 
loss that it has avoided. 28° 
Under both, South African law and the Principles, the aggrieved party 
has to take reasonable steps for the purpose of the mitigation of harm. It 
is not a duty lying upon the party but rather a rule limiting its right of 
recourse against the non-performing party. The onus in respect of a 
failure to take reasonable steps rests on the initially non-performing party 
which must prove that the aggrieved party failed to limit its loss by 
taking the reasonable steps. 281 There is an express rule in the Principles 
entitling the aggrieved party to recover any expenses incurred in 
attempting to mitigate the harm on condition that those expenses were 
reasonable in the circumstances. 282 
276Victoria Falls and Tvl Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 
AD 1 22; Hofmann and Carvalho v Minister of Agriculture 194 7 2 SA 855 (T) 
277 1990 3 SA 581 (A) 
278 Jockie v Meyer 1945 AD 354 
279 BK Toolings (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 
391 (A) 412-4 
28°Comment by UNIDROIT on Article 7.4.2 para.(l), internet, note 90 
281 See the South African cases listed in note 254 at Joubert, note 93, at 255; there is 
no clear rule in Article 7.4.8 dealing with the onus of proof, but it is clear from the 
wording that the non-performing party would use this article as a defence against the 
aggreived party's claim and would therefore have to establish the latter's failure. 
282Article 7.4.8 para.(2) 
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The two systems agree in that a party which does not pay a sum of 
money when it falls due owes the aggrieved party interest for the period 
of delay. 283 The applicable rate of interest is, under the Principles, the 
average bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers prevailing for 
the currency of payment at the place for payment. Under South African 
law, the "current" rate of interest is to be applied, which used to be 6% 
but could easily be proved to be higher or lower than that. Two statutory 
regulations have somewhat complicated the matter. The Limitation and 
Disclosure of Finance Charges Act 7 3 of 1968 limits the interest that a 
moneylender can recover to a certain legal maximum. The Prescribed 
Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975 authorizes the Minister of Justice to 
prescribe a rate of interest from time to time by means of a notice in the 
Government Gazette. In 1986, this rate was at 15%, and the courts can 
award interest at this rate if the rate was not fixed by agreement, custom 
or in some other manner. 284 
In practice, the result may be identical whether the Principles are applied 
or the traditional South African law. 
Furthermore, both, South African law and the Principles, authorize the 
parties to include clauses in their contract by which one or both parties 
promise to pay a specified sum of money in case of their failure to 
perform, the sum being independent of the actual harm sustained by the 
other party. 285 The purpose of this widely used instrument in 
international contract practice is to facilitate the recovery of damages by 
avoiding expensive litigation or problems of proof (the so-called 
liquidated damages) or, even more simple, to serve as a deterrent 
against non-performance (penalty clauses). Even if normally the non-
performance must be one for which the non-performing party is liable, 
the Principles accept clauses covering excused non-performances, 
leaving it entirely to the discretion of the parties. On the other hand, the 
Principles allow the courts to reduce the specified sum to a reasonable 
amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to the harm resulting 
from the non-performance, even if there is an agreement to the contrary 
283 Article 7.4.9 para.(l); in South African law, this interest is considered as general 
or foreseeable loss since the debtor could foresee that the creditor would lose its 
interest in the case of a delayed payment, see Joubert, note 93, at 261 
284See Joubert, note 93, at 262-3 
285 Article 7.4.13 para.(1) of the Principles; see Joubert, note 93, at 264-5 
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in the contract. The parties may under no circumstances exclude such a 
possibility of reduction. 286 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the great efforts made by UNIDROIT, there are still several 
areas of the law of contract that are not covered by the Principles, such 
as transfer of property; capacity of the parties; immorality and illegality, 
as well as lack of authority. With respect to these issues, it is still 
necessary to refer to the rules of private international and domestic law. 
As it was demonstrated above, 287 this involves considerable legal 
uncertainty and discourages traders, and in particular those from poorer 
and developing countries. Further efforts are thus necessary to elaborate 
rules covering these fields of law in order to provide a complete set of 
uniform rules for international transactions. 
However, in those areas of law that lie within the scope of the Principles, 
the rules would . be widely compatible with South African law, since 
definitions and essentials of the contract are mainly coincident. Where 
the Principles depart from South African law, this mostly results in a 
clear improvement of the legal situation, in particular with respect to the 
provisions on hardship, interpretation and formation of the contract. 
Hence, the Principles constitute a very attractive set of rules for South 
African businessmen, since, due to their similarity with South African 
contract law, there would be no considerable changes in the legal 
treatment of their international transactions except for better and clearer 
rules. 
286 Comment by UNIDROIT on Article 7.4.13, internet, note 90 
287 See Part one III 
